Fair revenue sharing mechanisms for strategic passenger airline alliances
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work p...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Berlin ; Heidelberg :
Springer-Verlag
2013.
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| Edición: | 1st ed. 2013. |
| Colección: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
668 |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009468915106719 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction
- Selected Topics in Revenue Management
- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory
- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game
- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances
- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances
- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices
- Conclusion and Future Research
- Appendix: Computational Study.
