Fair revenue sharing mechanisms for strategic passenger airline alliances
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work p...
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Berlin ; Heidelberg :
Springer-Verlag
2013.
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| Edición: | 1st ed. 2013. |
| Colección: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems,
668 |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009468915106719 |
| Sumario: | A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods. |
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| Notas: | Description based upon print version of record. |
| Descripción Física: | 1 online resource (180 p.) |
| ISBN: | 9783642358227 |
