Basic knowledge and conditions on knowledge

McBride's book considers a variety of puzzles concerning immediate justification and knowledge. These puzzles are of active interest in the field, and it is useful to address them all in a single volume. I learned from this book, even when it covered issues I already knew well. ―Prof. Christop...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: McBride, Mark, author (author)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, England : Open Book Publishers 2017
2017.
Materias:
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009420591006719
Descripción
Sumario:McBride's book considers a variety of puzzles concerning immediate justification and knowledge. These puzzles are of active interest in the field, and it is useful to address them all in a single volume. I learned from this book, even when it covered issues I already knew well. ―Prof. Christopher Tucker, William & Mary University How do we know what we know? In this stimulating and rigorous book, Mark McBride explores two sets of issues in contemporary epistemology: the problems that warrant transmission poses for the category of basic knowledge; and the status of conclusive reasons, sensitivity, and safety as conditions that are necessary for knowledge. To have basic knowledge is to know (have justification for) some proposition immediately, i.e., knowledge (justification) that doesn't depend on justification for any other proposition. This book considers several puzzles that arise when you take seriously the possibility that we can have basic knowledge. McBride's analysis draws together two vital strands in contemporary epistemology that are usually treated in isolation from each other. Additionally, its innovative arguments include a new application of the safety condition to the law.
Descripción Física:1 online resource (240 pages)
Bibliografía:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9781783742868
9791036509650
9781783742851