Tabla de Contenidos: “…Figure 1.6 Taux de change effectif réel dans sept pays d'Amérique latine, de janvier 2008 à mars 2011 -- Figure 1.7 Effets du contrôle des changes au Brésil et en Turquie -- Figure 1.8 Croissance du crédit réel dans sept pays d'Amérique latine, 2010 -- Figure 2.1 Pays d'Amérique latine et de l'OCDE : poids de la fonction publique dans la population active, 2008 -- Figure 2.2 Amérique latine et OCDE : dépenses publiques, 2000, 2007 et 2009 -- Figure 2.3 Amérique latine : couverture de programmes de transferts conditionnés -- Figure 2.4a Amérique latine et OCDE : l'exécutif a-t-il un pouvoir de veto sur la législation ? -- Figure 2.4b Amérique latine et OCDE : l'exécutif peut-il augmenter les dépenses après adoption du budget ? …”

Tabla de Contenidos: “….-6.6.10 Protocols -- 6.7 The Impact of Program Budget Implications (PBI) -- 6.8 Sovereignty, the New World Order and Implementing a Deal -- 6.9 Rights of Indigenous Peoples: -- 6.10 Non-ratification or Non implementation -- Chapter Seven: War and Peace – Roles for NGOs -- Extract -- 7.1 Law of War -- 7.2 At the Peace Table -- 7.3Neutrality and Working With or Avoiding the Military -- 7.4 An International Army and Peace Keeping -- 7.4.1 Operational Advantage -- 7.4.2 The Saarland and the First Multilateral Force -- 7.4.3 Misuse of a Force -- 7.4.4 The Veto As a Positive Tool -- 7.4.5 Conclusions -- 7.5 Working with Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) -- Chapter Eight: Failed and Weak Nation-states -- Highlights of Chapter Eight: -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.1.1 Coalition Building with Local NGOs -- 8.2 A Common Political and Economic Vision: -- 8.3 A Framework that is Inclusive and Avoids Retribution: -- 8.4 Democracy can be a quality control tool for economic policies -- 8.5 The Case of Egyptian Economic Development -- 8.6 Inform the Public.- 8.7 Equality of Opportunity and Good Governance Create Stable Politics -- Chapter Nine: International Funding -- Extract: -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Who Receives Government Funding? …”

“…Also examined are very contemporary constitutional debates, for which there were classical inspirations, including sovereign immunity, executive privilege, line-item vetoes, and the electoral college. Combining techniques of intellectual history, classical studies, and constitutional interpretation, this book makes a unique contribution to our understanding of contemporary constitutionalism…”

“…¿Puede el sistema americano salir adelante pese a los vetos en el Congreso y la presión de los lobbies y el dinero? …”

“…Third, the fiscal framework should be improved by making fiscal rules less pro-cyclical and by raising the profile and political acceptance of the fiscal council through better analytical support and an enlarged mandate, while removing its power to veto the budget. This Working Paper relates to the 2012 OECD Economic Survey of Hungary (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/hungary)…”