Foundations of an ethics of belief
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Frankfurt :
Ontos Verlag
©2013.
|
| Colección: | Practical philosophy ;
Bd. 15. |
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Click para texto completo desde fuera UPSA Click para texto completo desde UPSA |
| Ver en Biblioteca de la Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca: | https://koha.upsa.es/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=328217 |
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Tabla de Contenidos:
- TABLE OF CONTENTS; INTRODUCTION; The initial intuition; Main objective; Preliminary clarificatory remarks; Two central problems; The problem of control and responsibility; The normative problem; Abstracts of the chapters; Chapter 1: What the philosophy of action teaches us; Chapter 2: The impossibility of acquiring beliefs directly for reasons; Chapter 3: Pascalian and theoretical control; Chapter 4: Doxastic responsibility as responsibility for consequences; Chapter 5: Epistemic praiseworthiness and epistemic blameworthiness; Chapter 6: Beyond epistemic justifiedness.
- Chapter 7: Epistemic justifiedness and non-epistemic justifiednessChapter 1: What the philosophy of action teaches us; Actions and happenings; Non-reductionist conception of action; Reductionist conception of action; Actions, happenings and activities; Acting for reasons; Three distinctions about reasons; Motivating reasons vs. normative reasons; Internalism vs. externalism about reasons; Humean vs. anti-Humean conception of motivation; Back to the doxastic realm; Epistemic reasons, non-epistemic reasons and evidence; Delineating the interesting issue.
- Chapter 2: The Impossibility of directly acquiring beliefs for reasonsDirect and indirect belief acquisitions; Direct/indirect acquisitions of belief and epistemic/non-epistemic reasons; Williams' argument; "To believe that p is to believe that p is true"; Believing vs. imagining; Transparency; The teleological account; Conclusions; Chapter 3: Theoretical and Pascalian control; Two forms of indirect doxastic control; Theoretical control; Pascalian control; Indirect doxastic influence on belief acquisitions; Unlimited doxastic control considered; Ryan's unlimited doxastic control.
- Pieces of evidence vs. motivating reasonsSteup's unlimited doxastic control; Chapter 4: Doxastic Responsibility as Responsibility for Consequences; Responsibility for consequences; Responsibility for basic actions; Responsibility for the consequences of actions; Responsibility for resultant belief acquisitions, theoretical and Pascalian control; Responsibility for resultant belief acquisitions and indirect doxastic influence; Responsibility for believing; Chapter 5: Epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; Epistemic and non-epistemic desirability; The fundamental epistemic end.
- Other epistemically desirable statesThe fundamental epistemic end: some specifications; Epistemic and non-epistemic ends: summary; Varieties of epistemic goodness*; Final and instrumental epistemic goodness; Epistemic rationality and epistemic commendability; Varieties of epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; Final and instrumental epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; Epistemic praiseworthiness/blameworthiness for rational belief acquisitions.
