Plato's theory of knowledge the Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato
| Otros Autores: | , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Abingdon, Oxfordshire : New York :
Routledge
2010
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| Edición: | First issued in paperback 2010 |
| Colección: | International library of philosophy
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| Materias: | |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991011418435408016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Title; Copyright; Dedication; PREFACE; Contents; INTRODUCTION; THE THEAETETUS; 142A-143C. THE INTRODUCTORY DIALOGUE; THE MAIN DIALOGUE; 143D-151D. Introductory Conversation; I. The Claim of Perception to be Knowledge; II. The Claim of True Judgment to be Knowledge; III. The Claim of True Belief accompanied by an account or explanation' to be Knowledge; THE SOPHIST; 216A-218d. Introductory Conversation; 218d-221C. Illustrative Division defining the Angler; The seven Divisions defining the Sophist; 221C-223B. Division I. The Sophist as hunter
- 223C-224E. Divisions II-IV, The Sophist as salesman224E-226A. Division V. Eristic; 226A-231B. Division VI. Cathartic method of Socrates; The Methods of Collection and Division; 231B-235A. Survey yielding the genus 'Image-making'; 235A-236C. Division of Image-making into two species; 236C-237B. Statement of the problems of unreal appearances and of falsity in speech and thought; I. The Worlds of Reality and Appearance; 237B-239C. (a) The totally unreal; 239C-242B. (b) Definition of eidolon and the problem of false statement and belief; 242B-244B. (c) The perfectly real. What does 'real' mean ?
- 244B-245E. Criticism of Parmenides' One Real Being245E-246E. The Battle of Gods and Giants. Idealists and Materialists; 246E-248A. A mark of the real is offered for the Materialists' acceptance; 248A-249D. The Idealists must concede that reality includes some changing things; 249D-251A. Transition. What does the Idealist mean by 'real' ?; II. The Combination of Forms and the Problem of Negative Statements; 251A-C. Exclusion of the trivial question, how one individual thing can have many names; 251C-252E. Proof that some Forms will combine, others will not
- 252E-253C. The texture of philosophic discourse253C-254B. Description of the science of Dialectic; 254B-D. Three of the most important Forms selected for purposes of illustration: Existence, Motion, Rest; 254D-255E. Two further Forms, Sameness and Difference, distinct from these three and all-pervading; 255E-257A. A review of true statements involving the five Forms shows that there are any number of true statements asserting that 'what is' in a sense 'is not'; 257B-258C. There are also any number of true statements asserting that 'what is not' in a sense 'is'
- 258C-259D. Conclusion: We have refuted Parmenides' dogma that 'what is' cannot in any sense 'not-be', and that 'what is not' cannot in any sense 'be'III. False Speaking and Thinking; 259D-261C. Introductory statement of the problem; 261C-262E. Every statement is a complex of heterogeneous elements (name and verb); 262E. Every statement is about something and is either true or false; 262E-263B. The definition of true statement; 263B-D. The definition of false statement; 263D-264B. Judgment being simply unspoken statement, false judgment and false 'appearing' are possible
- 264B-D Transition, connecting these results with the interrupted Division of Image-making
