Movements of the mind : a theory of attention, intention and action

Movements of the mind a theory of attention, intention and action

Movements of the Mind addresses the fundamental question of what it is to be an agent. Wayne Wu tackles the phenomenon of mental agency by integrating philosophical and empirical work in an accessible way that illuminates key aspects of mind, such as control, attention, intention, memory, learning,...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Wu, Wayne, autor (autor)
Formato: Libro
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : Oxford University Press [2023]
Materias:
Mente y cuerpo
Filosofía de la mente
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991011294034208016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Movements of the Mind: A Theory of Attention, Intention and Action
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • 0.1 A Biologist's Perspective
  • 0.2 Central Themes
  • 0.3 The Book's Parts
  • 0.4 Chapter Summaries
  • 0.5 Acknowledgments
  • 0.6 Family
  • Claims by Section
  • PART I: THE STRUCTURE OF ACTION AND ATTENTION
  • 1: The Structure of Acting
  • 1.1 Introduction
  • 1.2 The Selection Problem and the Structure of Acting
  • 1.3 Intentions and Intentional Action
  • 1.4 Control and Automaticity
  • 1.5 The Necessity of Bias for Action
  • 1.6 The Biology of Intention-Based Biasing
  • 1.7 Intention-Based Biasing as Cognitive Integration
  • 1.8 Learning to Act and Shifting Control
  • 1.9 The Agent Must Be in Control in Action
  • 1.10 The Agent's Being Active
  • 1.11 Taking Stock
  • Appendix 1.1
  • Notes
  • 2: Attention and Attending
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Merging the Psychology and Philosophy of Attention
  • 2.3 Attention and the Selection Problem
  • 2.4 Attention as Guide versus Attention as Mechanism
  • 2.5 Perceptual Attending as Mental Action
  • 2.6 Goal-Directed Automatic Attention and Bias
  • 2.7 Attentional Capture and Passive Agency
  • 2.8 How Much Attention Is There in the World of Action?
  • 2.9 Action Is Necessary for Attention
  • 2.10 On Different Lessons from Causal Deviance
  • 2.11 Agentive Control and Guidance Revisited
  • 2.12 Taking Stock
  • Notes
  • PART II: INTENTION AS PRACTICAL MEMORY AND REMEMBERING
  • 3: Intention as Practical Memory
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Memory in Action
  • 3.3 Empirical Theories of Working Memory
  • 3.4 Memory at Work
  • 3.5 Vigilance
  • 3.6 Steadfastness and Sustained Attention
  • 3.7 Taking Stock
  • Notes
  • 4: Intending as Practical Remembering
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 The Continuity of Practical Memory
  • 4.3 Practical Fine-Tuning
  • 4.4 Fine-Tuning as Practical Memory at Work
  • 4.5 The Dynamics of Thinking about Action, in Action
  • 4.6 First-Personal Access to Intentional Action
  • 4.7 On Keeping Time with Action
  • 4.8 Taking Stock
  • Notes
  • PART III: MOVEMENTS OF THE MIND AS DEPLOYMENTS OF ATTENTION
  • 5: Automatic Bias, Experts and Amateurs
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 A Structure for Explaining Bias
  • 5.3 Epistemic Bias Is Necessitated Bias
  • 5.4 Overt Attending as Mental Bias
  • 5.5 Epistemic Virtue in the Eye
  • 5.6 Automatic Bias and the Distribution of Gaze as Good
  • 5.7 Automatic Thinking in Fields of Thought
  • 5.8 The Norms of Attention
  • 5.9 Taking Stock
  • Note
  • 6: Deducing, Skill and Knowledge
  • 6.1 Introduction
  • 6.2 Deducing with Models
  • 6.3 Formally Deducing and Learning Rules
  • 6.4 Taking and Sensitivity
  • 6.5 Skill and Knowledge
  • 6.6 Knowledgeable Control and Practical Understanding
  • 6.7 Taking Stock
  • Notes
  • 7: Introspecting Perceptual Experience
  • 7.1 Introduction
  • 7.2 The Need to Carefully Define Introspective Tasks
  • 7.3 Introspecting as Mental Action
  • 7.4 Reliability Conditions for Simple Introspection
  • 7.5 Complex Introspection and Blur
  • 7.6 Introspection and Bad Cases
  • 7.7 Taking Stock
  • Notes
  • Epilogue
  • Bibliography
  • Index

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