Free will as an open scientific problem
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge, Massachusetts :
MIT Press
cop 2010
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| Materias: | |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991010448499708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction. Formulating the problem of free will
- Some remarks on libertarianism
- Synopsis of the book
- Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant. Introduction
- What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct?
- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will question, assuming the OL view is correct
- Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will question, even if the OL view isn't correct
- Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question
- Where we stand and where we're going next
- An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question
- Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy. Introduction
- Preliminaries
- The argument
- Non-torn decisions
- Where we stand
- Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism). Introduction
- An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism)?
- An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-indeterminism)?
- Empirical arguments?
- Where we stand.
