Philosophy of psychology a contemporary introduction
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
London ; New York :
Routledge
2005.
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| Colección: | Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy
|
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991009495119708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Levels of psychological explanation and the interface problem
- Explanation at different levels
- Personal and subpersonal levels of explanation
- Horizontal explanation, vertical explanation, and commonsense psychology
- the interface problem and four pictures of the mind
- The nature of commonsense psychology: the autonomous mind and the functional mind
- The autonomous mind and commonsense psychology
- The autonomous mind and the interface problem
- The functional mind
- Philosophical functionalism and psychological functionalism
- Psychological functionalism and the interface problem
- Causes in the mind : from the functional mind to the
- Representational mind
- Causation by content : problems with the functional mind
- The representational mind and the language of thought
- The mind as a computer
- Neural networks and the neurocomputational mind
- Top-down explanation vs. the co-evolutionary research strategy
- Cognition, co-evolution, and the brain
- Neural network models
- Neural network modelling and the co-evolutionary research paradigm : the example of language
- Rationality, mental causation and commonsense psychology
- Real patterns without real causes
- How anomalous is the mental?
- The counterfactual approach
- The scope of commonsense psychology
- Thinking about the scope of commonsense psychology
- Implicit and explicit commonsense psychology : the broad construal
- Modest revisionism : the simulationist proposal
- Narrowing the scope of commonsense psychology (1)
- Narrowing the scope of commonsense psychology (2)
- Emotion perception in social interactions
- The indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma
- 6.5.3. frames and routines
- A suggestion?
- From perception to action
- From perception to action : the standard view
- Cognitive architecture and the standard view
- The distinction between perception and cognition
- Domain-specific reasoning and the massive modularity hypothesis
- Propositional attitudes : contents and vehicle
- Another look at the interface problem
- The argument for structure
- The problem of structure in artificial neural networks
- Rejecting the structure requirement
- Finding structure in artificial neural networks
- Words and thoughts
- Thinking in words (1) : the inner speech hypothesis
- Thinking in words (2) : the rewiring hypothesis
- The state of play
- Practical reasoning and the language of thought
- Perceptual integration
- Concept learning.
