Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on methods of inquiry
Carnap, Quine, and Putnam held that in our pursuit of truth we can do no better than to start in the middle, relying on already-established beliefs and inferences and applying our best methods for re-evaluating particular beliefs and inferences and arriving at new ones. In this collection of essays,...
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| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
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New York :
Cambridge University Press
cop. 2017
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| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991009262889708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Part I. Carnap: 1. Carnap's logical syntax; 2. Carnap on ontology; Part II. Carnap and Quine: 3. Carnap and Quine on truth by convention; 4. Quine's naturalistic explication of Carnap's logic of science; Part III. Quine: 5. Quine gets the last word; 6. Reading Quine's claim that definitional abbreviations create synonymies; 7. Can logical truth be defined in purely extensional terms?; 8. Reading Quine's claim that no statement is immune to revision; Part IV. Quine and Putnam: 9. Conditionalization and conceptual change: Chalmers in defense of a dogma; 10. Truth and trans-theoretical terms: Part V. Putnam: 11. Putnam and the contextually apriori.
