The second-person standpoint morality, respect, and accountability
Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner - along with the moral scepticism and ethical confusion that ensure - result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obli...
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| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
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Cambridge, Mass. ; London :
Harvard University Press
cop. 2006
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| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991008889959708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Part I: The main ideas I
- The main ideas II
- The second-person stance and second-personal reasons
- Part II: Accountability and the second person
- Moral obligation and accountability
- Respect and the second person
- Part III: The psychology of the second person
- Interlude: Hume versus Reid on Justice (with contemporary resonances)
- Part IV: Morality and autonomy in Kant
- The second person and dignity: variations on Fichtean Themes
- Freedom and practical reason
- Foundation for contractualism.
