The foundations of behavioral economic analysis

The foundations of behavioral economic analysis

Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Dhami, Sanjit S., autor (autor)
Formato: Libro
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : Oxford University Press 2016
Edición:1st ed
Materias:
Economía > Aspectos psicológicos
Ver en Universidad de Navarra:https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991008030979708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • LIST OF FIGURES
  • LIST OF TABLES
  • Introduction
  • 1 The antecedents of behavioral economics
  • 2 On methodology in economics
  • 3 The experimental method in economics
  • 3.1 Experiments and internal validity
  • 3.2 Subject pools used in lab experiments
  • 3.3 Stake sizes in experiments
  • 3.4 The issue of the external validity of lab findings
  • 3.5 The role of incentives in economics
  • 3.6 Is survey data of any use?
  • 4 Approach and organization of the book 5 Five theoretical approaches in behavioral economics
  • 5.1 A case study of prospect theory
  • 5.2 Human sociality and inequity averse preferences
  • 5.3 The quasi-hyperbolic model and self-control problems
  • 5.4 Level-k and CH models: disequilibrium in beliefs in strategic interaction
  • 5.5 The heuristics and biases program: radical behavioral economics
  • 6 Five examples of behavioral evidence
  • 6.1 Does competitive market equilibrium survive fairness considerations?
  • 6.2 Why do we not let bygones be bygones?
  • 6.3 Are financial markets efficient? 6.4 Is expert behavior consistent with neoclassical economics?
  • 6.5 Do people play a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium?
  • Appendix A: The random lottery incentive mechanism
  • Appendix B: In lieu of a problem set
  • References
  • PART 1: Behavioral Economics of Risk, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity
  • Introduction to part 1
  • CHAPTER 1: The Evidence on Human Choice under Risk and Uncertainty
  • 1.1 Introduction
  • 1.2 The elements of classical decision theory
  • 1.2.1 Preference foundations of expected utility theory (EU)
  • 1.2.2 Attitudes to risk under EU 1.3 Subjective expected utility theory (SE
  • 1.4 Eliciting the utility function under EU
  • 1.4.1 The case of known probabilities
  • 1.4.2 The case of unknown probabilities
  • 1.5 Violations of expected utility theory
  • 1.5.1 Violations of the independence axiom
  • 1.5.2 The probability triangle and violations of the axioms of rationality
  • 1.5.3 Some attempts to relax the independence axiom
  • 1.5.4 Attitudes to risk for small and large stakes: Rabin's paradox
  • 1.5.5 Violations of description invariance
  • 1.5.6 Preference reversals
  • 1.5.7 Is the reduction axiom supported by the evidence? CHAPTER 2: Behavioral Models of Decision Making
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Probability weighting functions
  • 2.2.1 Prelec's probability weighting function
  • 2.2.2 Stochastic dominance under non-linear probability weighting
  • 2.3 Rank dependent utility theory (RDU)
  • 2.3.1 Attitudes to risk under RDU
  • 2.3.2 RDU under uncertainty
  • 2.3.3 Drawbacks of RDU
  • 2.4 Prospect theory (PT)
  • 2.4.1 A brief note on PT under uncertainty
  • 2.4.2 Attitudes to risk under prospect theory
  • 2.4.3 A violation of EU and RDU that can be explained by PT
  • 2.4.4 Some erroneous criticisms of PT
  • 2.5 Elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions in PT

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