Fragile by design the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Princeton :
Princeton University Press
2015
|
| Colección: | The Princeton economic history of the western world
|
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991007895859708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- 1. No banks without states, and no states without banks
- If stable and efficient banks are such a good idea, why are they so rare?
- The game of bank bargains
- Tools of conquest and survival: why states need banks
- Privileges with burdens: war, empire, and the monopoly structure of English banking
- Banks and democracy: Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
- 2. The cost of banker-populist alliances: the United States versus Canada
- Crippled by populism: U.S. banking from colonial times to 1990
- The new U.S. bank bargain: megabanks, urban activists, and the erosion of mortgage standards
- Leverage, regulatory failure, and the subprime crisis
- Durable partners: politics and banking in Canada
- 3. Authoritarianism, democratic transitions, and the game of bank bargains
- Mexico: chaos makes cronyism look good
- When autocracy fails: banking and politics in Mexico since 1982
- Inflation machines: banking and state finance in imperial Brazil
- The democratic consequences of inflation-tax banking in Brazil
- 4. Going beyond structural narratives
- Traveling to other places: is our sample representative?
- Reality is a plague on many houses.
