Mental reality
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge :
MIT Press
2010
|
| Edición: | 2nd ed., with a new appendix |
| Colección: | Representation and mind
|
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991006844959708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction
- A default position
- Experience
- The character of experience
- Understanding-experience
- A note about dispositional mental states
- Purely experiential content
- An account of four seconds of thought
- Questions
- The mental and the nonmental
- The mental and the publicly observable
- The mental and the behavioral
- Neobehaviorism and reductionism
- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind
- Conclusion: The three questions
- Agnostic materialism, part 1
- Monism
- The linguistic argument
- Materialism and monism
- A comment on reduction
- The impossibility of an objective phenomenology
- Asymmetry and reduction
- Equal-status monism
- Panpsychism
- The inescapability of metaphysics
- Agnostic materialism, part 2
- Ignorance
- Sensory spaces
- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration
- The hard part of the mind-body problem
- Neutral monism and agnostic monism
- A comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on
- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism
- Mentalism
- Strict or pure process idealism
- Active-principle idealism
- Stuff idealism
- Immaterialism
- The positions restated
- The dualist options
- Frege's thesis
- Objections to pure process idealism
- The problem of mental dispositions
- Mental
- Shared abilities
- The sorting ability
- The definition of mental being
- Mental phenomena
- The view that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena
- Natural intentionality
- E/c intentionality
- The experienceless
- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects
- Experience, purely experiential content, and n/c intentionality
- Concepts in nature
- Intentionality and experience
- Summary with problem
- Pain and pain
- The neo-behaviorist view
- A linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior
- A challenge
- The Sirians
- N.N. Novel
- An objection to the Sirians
- The Betelgeuzians
- The point of the Sirians
- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain
- Unpleasantness and qualitative character
- The weather watchers
- The rooting story
- What is it like to be a weather watcher?
- The aptitudes of mental states
- The argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space
- The argument from the conditions for language ability
- The argument from the nature of desire
- Desire and affect
- The argument from the phenomenology of desire
- Behavior
- A hopeless definition
- Difficulties
- Other-observability
- Neo-behaviorism
- The concept of mind.
