Ad infinitum new essays on epistemological infinitism
This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs-an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning...
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| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press
2014
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| Edición: | 1st ed |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991005141979708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Introduction ; 1. Knowing Better, Cognitive Command, and Epistemic Infinitism ; 2. Klein and the Regress Argument ; 3. Reasons Require Reasons ; 4. Infinitism ; 5. Virtue and Vice Among the Infinite ; 6. Reasons, Reasoning and Knowledge: A Proposed Rapprochement between Infinitism and Foundationalism ; 7. Infinitist Justification and Proper Basing ; 8. Klein's Case for Infinitism ; 9. Can an Infinite Regress Justify Everything? ; 10. Can Perception Halt the Regress of Justifications? ; 11. Infinitism ; 12. Creative Reasoning ; 13. Avoiding the Regress ; 14. First Person and Third Person Reasons and the Regress Problem
