No morality, no self Anscombe's radical skepticism
It is becoming increasingly apparent that Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001), long known as a student, friend and translator of Wittgenstein, was herself one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. No Morality, No Self examines her two best-known papers, in which she advanced her mo...
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| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge, Massachusetts , London :
Harvard University Press
2018
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| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991002413269708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Part One. No morality: "Modern moral philosophy" (1958): Virtue ethics, eudaimonism, and the Greeks
- The invention of 'morality' and the possibility of consequentialism
- The misguided project of vindicating morality
- The futility of seeking the extension of a word with no intension
- What's really wrong with the vocabulary of morality?
- Assessing MMP
- Part Two: No self: "the first person" (1975): The circularity problem for accounts of 'I' as a device of self-reference
- Is the fundamental reference rule for 'I' the key to explaining first person self-reference?
- Rumfitt's solution to the circularity problem
- Can we make sense of a non-referential account of 'I'?
- Strategies for saving 'I' as a singular term: domesticating FP and deflating reference
- The first person and abstraction
- Epilogue: The anti-cartesian basis of Anscombe's scepticism
