Everything, more or less a defence of generality relativism
Presentación del editor: "Almost no systematic theorizing is generality-free. Scientists test general hypotheses; set theorists prove theorems about every set; metaphysicians espouse theses about all things regardless of their kind. But how general can we be and do we ever succeed in theorizing...
| Otros Autores: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Oxford ; New York, NY :
Oxford University Press
2019
|
| Colección: | Oxford philosophical monographs
|
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Universidad de Navarra: | https://unika.unav.edu/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma991000956679708016&context=L&vid=34UNAV_INST:VU1&search_scope=34UNAV_TODO&tab=34UNAV_TODO&lang=es |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Acknowledgements
- 1. Absolutism and relativism
- 2. Russell, Zermelo, and Dummett
- 3. Quantifiers
- 4. Restrictionism and expansionism
- 5. Schemas
- 6. Modal operators
- 7. Russell Reductio Redux
- 8. How universes expand
- Appendix A. Logic
- Appendix B. Modalization
- Appendix C. Set theory
- Bibliography
- Index.
