Responsibility for Rationality Foundations of an Ethics of Mind

This book argues that we are directly responsible for our attitudes by considering how we blame each other for being irrational. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Schmidt, Sebastian (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : Taylor & Francis Group 2024.
Edición:1st ed
Colección:Routledge Studies in Epistemology Series
Materias:
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009874139606719
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Series Page
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Table of Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Part 1 The Problem of Mental Responsibility
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Mental Responsibility
  • 3 Rationality and Reasons
  • Part 2 The Normativity of Epistemic Rationality
  • 4 A Neglected Challenge for the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality
  • 5 Blameworthiness for Epistemic Irrationality
  • Part 3 Foundations of an Ethics of Mind
  • 6 A Hybrid Account of Mental Responsibility
  • 7 Moralizing Rationality
  • 8 Conclusion
  • References
  • Index.