Concepts at the interface

Concepts at the interface

Concepts are how we classify things in the world and organise our knowledge about them. But concepts also lead us astray, driving lazy overgeneralizations and housing unpleasant prejudices. This book draws on the latest scientific research to construct a philosophical theory of how concepts do the j...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Shea, Nicholas, 1970- author (author)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Oxford : Oxford University Press [2024]
Edición:First edition
Colección:Oxford scholarship online.
Materias:
Concepts.
Philosophy.
Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge.
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009852326906719
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Concepts at the Interface
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • 1: Thinking with Concepts
  • 1.1 Concepts in the Playground of Thought
  • 1.2 Deliberation
  • 1.3 Non-Local Inference
  • 1.4 Concepts as an Interface
  • 1.5 Metacognition
  • 1.6 Re-casting the Distinctions
  • 1.7 What's New?
  • Chapter Summary
  • 1.1 Concepts in the Playground of Thought
  • 1.2 Deliberation
  • 1.3 Non-Local Inference
  • 1.4 Concepts as an Interface
  • 1.5 Metacognition
  • 1.6 Re-casting the Distinctions
  • 1.7 What's New?
  • 2: Representational Structure
  • 2.1 What is Semantically-Significant Representational Structure?
  • 2.2 Varieties of Semantically-Significant Representational Structure
  • 2.3 Structural Representation
  • 2.4 General-Purpose Compositional Structure
  • 2.5 Terminology
  • Chapter Summary
  • 2.1 What is Semantically-Significant Representational Structure?
  • 2.2 Varieties of Semantically-Significant Representational Structure
  • 2.3 Structural Representation
  • 2.4 General-Purpose Compositional Structure
  • 3: Computational Processes
  • 3.1 Transitions Faithful to Content
  • 3.2 Content-Specific and Content-General Transitions
  • 3.3 Types of Transition Go with Types of Representational Structure
  • 3.4 Content-Specific Transitions Involving Concepts
  • Chapter Summary
  • 3.1 Transitions Faithful to Content
  • 3.2 Content-Specific and Content-General Transitions
  • 3.3 Types of Transition Go with Types of Representational Structure
  • 3.4 Content-Specific Transitions Involving Concepts
  • 4: Informational Models
  • 4.1 Ways of Storing Information
  • 4.2 Information in Domain-Specific Transitions
  • 4.3 'Model-Based' Tasks
  • 4.4 Structural Representations
  • 4.5 Relational Inference Tasks
  • 4.6 Using One Relation to Stand for Another
  • 4.7 Models Built out of Concepts
  • 4.8 Conclusion
  • Chapter Summary.
  • 4.1 Ways of Storing Information
  • 4.2 Information in Domain-Specific Transitions
  • 4.3 'Model-Based' Tasks
  • 4.4 Structural Representations
  • 4.5 Relational Inference Tasks
  • 4.6 Using One Relation to Stand for Another
  • 4.7 Models Built out of Concepts
  • 4.8 Conclusion
  • 5: Concepts as an Interface
  • 5.1 Reaching Conclusions via Simulations
  • 5.2 Simulations Use Special-Purpose Informational Models
  • 5.3 Concepts as Plug-and-Play Devices
  • 5.4 Mediating between Type 1 and Type 2 Processes
  • 5.5 Shifting Information between Systems
  • 5.6 Models of Working Memory Labels
  • 5.7 Concept Individuation
  • 5.8 The Simulation Combination Puzzle
  • 5.9 Bringing It All Together
  • Chapter Summary
  • 5.1 Reaching Conclusions via Simulations
  • 5.2 Simulations Use Special-Purpose Informational Models
  • 5.3 Concepts as Plug-and-Play Devices
  • 5.4 Mediating between Type 1 and Type 2 Processes
  • 5.5 Shifting Information between Systems
  • 5.6 Models of Working Memory Labels
  • 5.7 Concept Individuation
  • 5.8 The Simulation Combination Puzzle
  • 5.9 Bringing It All Together
  • 6: The Frame Problem and the If-Then Problem
  • 6.1 The Frame Problem
  • 6.2 Avoiding the Frame Problem Leads to the If-Then Problem
  • 6.3 A Compound Architecture Still Faces the Frame Problem
  • 6.4 A (Partial) Solution
  • 6.5 How Cognition Partly Avoids and Partially Solves the Frame Problem
  • Chapter Summary
  • 6.1 The Frame Problem
  • 6.2 Avoiding the Frame Problem Leads to the If-Then Problem
  • 6.3 A Compound Architecture Still Faces the Frame Problem
  • 6.4 A (Partial) Solution
  • 6.5 How Cognition Partly Avoids and Partially Solves the Frame Problem
  • 7: Drawing on Meaning
  • 7.1 Introduction
  • 7.2 The Phenomenon: Drawing on Meaning
  • 7.3 Semantic Inference and Syntactic Inference
  • 7.4 Content-Specific Transitions Draw on More Contents.
  • 7.5 Are Content-Specific Transitions Really So Different?
  • 7.6 Conclusion
  • Chapter Summary
  • 7.1 Introduction
  • 7.2 The Phenomenon: Drawing on Meaning
  • 7.3 Semantic Inference and Syntactic Inference
  • 7.4 Content-Specific Transitions Draw on More Contents
  • 7.5 Are Content-Specific Transitions Really So Different?
  • 7.6 Conclusion
  • 8: Metacognition
  • 8.1 Introduction
  • 8.2 Metacognition
  • 8.3 Appraisal of Concepts
  • 8.4 Reliability of Inference
  • 8.5 Coherence in the Cognitive Playground
  • 8.6 Conclusion
  • Chapter Summary
  • 8.1 Introduction
  • 8.2 Metacognition
  • 8.3 Appraisal of Concepts
  • 8.4 Reliability of Inference
  • 8.5 Coherence in the Cognitive Playground
  • 8.6 Conclusion
  • 9: Concluding Thoughts
  • 9.1 Deliberating with Concepts: The Picture
  • 9.2 Concepts Look Both Ways
  • 9.3 Tokening a Concept
  • 9.4 Doing in Thought
  • 9.5 The Unreasonable Power of Human Cognition
  • Chapter Summary
  • 9.1 Deliberating with Concepts: The Picture
  • 9.2 Concepts Look Both Ways
  • 9.3 Tokening a Concept
  • 9.4 Doing in Thought
  • 9.5 The Unreasonable Power of Human Cognition
  • Acknowledgements
  • Figure Credits
  • References
  • Index.

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