The politics of platform regulation : how governments shape online content moderation

The politics of platform regulation how governments shape online content moderation

Leading multinational technology companies like Alphabet, Meta, Twitter, TikTok, & Microsoft now operate sprawling, complex systems to govern online behaviour. These technical & bureaucratic infrastructures, commonly termed 'content moderation' or 'trust & safety,' we...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Gorwa, Robert, author (author)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York, NY : Oxford University Press [2024]
Edición:1st ed
Colección:Oxford scholarship online.
Materias:
Online social networks > Law and legislation.
Online social networks > Political aspects.
Social media > Law and legislation.
Social media > Government policy.
Law.
Laws of specific jurisdictions & specific areas of law.
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009836119806719
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Oxford Studies in Digital Politics
  • The Politics of Platform Regulation: How Governments Shape Online Content Moderation
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1: Introduction
  • 1.1 The Politics of Platform Regulation
  • 1.1.1 Core Argument
  • 1.1.2 Emprical Approach
  • 1.1.3 What the Book Is Not
  • 1.2 Outline of the Book
  • 1.2.1 Foundations
  • 1.2.2 Case Studies
  • 1.2.3 Looking Forward
  • Part One: Foundations
  • 2: Governance by Platforms: Definitions, Histories, Concepts
  • 2.1 What Is a Platform?
  • 2.1.1 In Defense of Platforms: Definitions
  • 2.1.2 Platform Companies are Companies
  • 2.2 How Do Platforms Companies Govern?
  • 2.2.1 Community Vs. Commercial: The Evolution of Content Moderation
  • 2.2.2 Structural Governance by Platforms: Gatekeeping, Dependency, and Network Effects
  • 2.3 Key Trends in Platform Governance
  • 3: Regulating Platform Companies: A Cross-Domain Policy Overview
  • 3.1 Data Protection Regulation
  • 3.2 Competition Law and Policy
  • 3.2.1 The Evolving European Approach
  • 3.2.2 Additional Global Context
  • 3.3 Labor Law
  • 3.4 Content Regulation
  • 3.4.1 Liability Shields
  • 3.4.2 Control Regimes
  • 3.4.3 Informal Negotiation
  • 3.4.4 Platform-Specific Rules
  • 3.5 Emerging Trends in Platform Regulation
  • 4: Explaining Government Intervention in Content Moderation
  • 4.1 Why Does the State Get Involved? Political Demand
  • 4.2 How Does the State Get Involved? Intervention Strategies
  • 4.2.1 Contesting
  • 4.2.2 Collaborating
  • 4.2.3 Convincing
  • 4.3 When Can the State Get Involved? The Power to Intervene
  • 4.3.1 Regulatory Capacity
  • 4.3.2 Institutional Constraints
  • 4.3.3 Normative Landscape
  • 4.4 Explaining Government Intervention in Platform Governance
  • 4.5 Testing the Framework
  • 4.5.1 Methods and Case Selection
  • Part Two: Case Studies.
  • 5: 'What Is Illegal Offline, Should Be Illegal Online': The Development of the German NetzDG
  • 5.1 The Task Force, 2015-2017
  • 5.1.1 Negotiating (Voluntary) Comitments
  • 5.2 The Network Enforcement Act, 2017-2018
  • 5.2.1 Demand for Changing the (Collaborative Status QUO)
  • 5.2.2 Attempts to Tamper Down Demand
  • 5.2.3 Supply Factors
  • 5.3 Berlin vs. Brussels: The EU Harmonization Procedure
  • 5.3.1 Overcoming Those Contraints: Dealmaking with the commission
  • 5.4 Discussion
  • 6: After Christchurch: Diverging Regulatory Responses in New Zealand and Australia
  • 6.1 The Early Fight to Set the Agenda in New Zealand
  • 6.1.1 Negotiating the Options with Civil Society
  • 6.2 Collaborative or Contested? Developing the Australian AVM Act
  • 6.2.1 Early Negotiations with Firms: The Brisbane summit
  • 6.2.2 Here Come the Election. . .
  • 6.2.3 Parliamentary Debate and Opposition
  • 6.3 New Zealand's Platform Diplomacy
  • 6.3.1 Implementing the Christchurch Responses
  • 6.4 Discussion
  • 7: From Coast to Coast: State-Level Platform Regulation in the United States
  • 7.1 Two Waves of 'Techlash'
  • 7.1.1 Dissatisfaction with the Staus QUO on the Right
  • 7.1.2 Signs of Discontent on the Left
  • 7.2 Attempts at Federal-Level Platform Regulation
  • 7.2.1 Executive Orders and Other Executive Powers
  • 7.2.2 Regulator-Driven Change
  • 7.2.3 Legilation
  • 7.2.4 The Courts
  • 7.3 The States Join the Fray
  • 7.3.1 Florida
  • 7.3.2 Texas
  • 7.4 Discussion
  • Part Three: Looking Forward
  • 8: Platform Regulation and the Majority World
  • 8.1 China
  • 8.1.1 Analysis
  • 8.2 India
  • 8.2.1 Intermediary Guidelines 2021-2022
  • 8.2.2 Analysis
  • 8.3 Brazil
  • 8.3.1 Analysis
  • 9: Conclusion
  • 9.1 Case Studies: A Closing Reflection
  • 9.2 Future Research and the Years Ahead
  • Appendix A: Methods Appendix
  • A.1 The Interview Process.
  • A.1.1 Research Ethics and attribution
  • A.1.2 Participants
  • A.2 Freedom of Information Requests
  • Appendix B: BRegulatory Context Appendix
  • B.1 Germany
  • B.1.1 Key Actors
  • B.1.2 Power Resources &amp
  • Institional Contraints
  • B.1.3 Normative Landscape
  • B.2 Australia
  • B.2.1 Key Actos
  • B.2.2 Power Resources &amp
  • Institutional constraints
  • B2.3 Normative Landscape
  • B.3 New Zealand
  • B.3.1 Key Actors
  • B.2.2 Power Resources &amp
  • Institutional constraints
  • B.3.3 Normative Landscape
  • Notes
  • References
  • Index.

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