Asymmetric cryptography : primitives and protocols

Asymmetric cryptography primitives and protocols

Public key cryptography was introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976, and it was soon followed by concrete instantiations of public-key encryption and signatures; these led to an entirely new field of research with formal definitions and security models. Since then, impressive tools have been develo...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Pointcheval, David, editor (editor)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Hoboken : ISTE Ltd [2022]
Edición:[First edition]
Colección:Sciences. Computer science: Cryptography, data security.
Materias:
Cryptography.
Data encryption (Computer science)
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009724223006719
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • Foreword
  • Chapter 1. Public-Key Encryption and Security Notions
  • 1.1. Basic definitions for PKE
  • 1.1.1. Basic notation
  • 1.1.2. Public-key encryption
  • 1.1.3. IND-CPA and IND-CCA security
  • 1.1.4. Other basic security notions and relations
  • 1.2. Basic PKE schemes
  • 1.2.1. Game-based proofs
  • 1.2.2. ElGamal encryption
  • 1.2.3. Simplified CS encryption
  • 1.2.4. Cramer-Shoup encryption
  • 1.2.5. Other specific PKE schemes
  • 1.3. Generic constructions for IND-CCA secure PKE
  • 1.3.1. Hybrid encryption
  • 1.3.2. Naor-Yung construction and extensions
  • 1.3.3. Fujisaki-Okamoto and other transforms in the RO model
  • 1.3.4. Other generic constructions for IND-CCA secure PKE
  • 1.4. Advanced topics
  • 1.4.1. Intermediate notions related to CCA
  • 1.4.2. IND-CCA security in multi-user setting and tight security
  • 1.4.3. Key-dependent message security
  • 1.4.4. More topics on PKE
  • 1.5. References
  • Chapter 2. Signatures and Security Notions
  • 2.1. Signature schemes
  • 2.1.1. Definition
  • 2.1.2. Examples of practical schemes
  • 2.2. Unforgeability
  • 2.2.1. Discussion
  • 2.2.2. Existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks
  • 2.2.3. Unforgeability of practical schemes
  • 2.3. Strong unforgeability
  • 2.3.1. Discussion
  • 2.3.2. Strong existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks
  • 2.3.3. Strong unforgeability of practical schemes
  • 2.3.4. Building strongly unforgeable schemes
  • 2.4. Summary
  • 2.5. References
  • Chapter 3. Zero-Knowledge Proofs
  • 3.1. Introduction
  • 3.2. Notation
  • 3.3. Classical zero-knowledge proofs
  • 3.3.1. Zero knowledge
  • 3.4. How to build a zero-knowledge proof system
  • 3.4.1. ZK proofs for all NP
  • 3.4.2. Round complexity
  • 3.5. Relaxed security in proof systems
  • 3.5.1. Honest-verifier ZK.
  • 3.5.2. Witness hiding/indistinguishability
  • 3.5.3. Ó-Protocols
  • 3.6. Non-black-box zero knowledge
  • 3.7. Advanced notions
  • 3.7.1. Publicly verifiable zero knowledge
  • 3.7.2. Concurrent ZK and more
  • 3.7.3. ZK with stateless players
  • 3.7.4. Delayed-input proof systems
  • 3.8. Conclusion
  • 3.9. References
  • Chapter 4. Secure Multiparty Computation
  • 4.1. Introduction
  • 4.1.1. A note on terminology
  • 4.2. Security of MPC
  • 4.2.1. The definitional paradigm
  • 4.2.2. Additional definitional parameters
  • 4.2.3. Adversarial power
  • 4.2.4. Modular sequential and concurrent composition
  • 4.2.5. Important definitional implications
  • 4.2.6. The ideal model and using MPC in practice
  • 4.2.7. Any inputs are allowed
  • 4.2.8. MPC secures the process, but not the output
  • 4.3. Feasibility of MPC
  • 4.4. Techniques
  • 4.4.1. Shamir secret sharing
  • 4.4.2. Honest-majority MPC with secret sharing
  • 4.4.3. Private set intersection
  • 4.4.4. Threshold cryptography
  • 4.4.5. Dishonest-majority MPC
  • 4.4.6. Efficient and practical MPC
  • 4.5. MPC use cases
  • 4.5.1. Boston wage gap (Lapets et al. 2018)
  • 4.5.2. Advertising conversion (Ion et al. 2017)
  • 4.5.3. MPC for cryptographic key protection (Unbound Security
  • Sepior
  • Curv)
  • 4.5.4. Government collaboration (Sharemind)
  • 4.5.5. Privacy-preserving analytics (Duality)
  • 4.6. Discussion
  • 4.7. References
  • Chapter 5. Pairing-Based Cryptography
  • 5.1. Introduction
  • 5.1.1. Notations
  • 5.1.2. Generalities
  • 5.2. One small step for man, one giant leap for cryptography
  • 5.2.1. Opening Pandora's box, demystifying the magic
  • 5.2.2. A new world of assumptions
  • 5.3. A new world of cryptographic protocols at your fingertips
  • 5.3.1. Identity-based encryption made easy
  • 5.3.2. Efficient deterministic compact signature
  • 5.4. References.
  • Chapter 6. Broadcast Encryption and Traitor Tracing
  • 6.1. Introduction
  • 6.2. Security notions for broadcast encryption and TT
  • 6.3. Overview of broadcast encryption and TT
  • 6.4. Tree-based methods
  • 6.5. Code-based TT
  • 6.6. Algebraic schemes
  • 6.7. Lattice-based approach with post-quantum security
  • 6.8. References
  • Chapter 7. Attribute-Based Encryption
  • 7.1. Introduction
  • 7.2. Pairing groups
  • 7.2.1. Cyclic groups
  • 7.2.2. Pairing groups
  • 7.3. Predicate encodings
  • 7.3.1. Definition
  • 7.3.2. Constructions
  • 7.4. Attribute-based encryption
  • 7.4.1. Definition
  • 7.4.2. A modular construction
  • 7.5. References
  • Chapter 8. Advanced Signatures
  • 8.1. Introduction
  • 8.2. Some constructions
  • 8.2.1. The case of scalar messages
  • 8.2.2. The case of non-scalar messages
  • 8.3. Applications
  • 8.3.1. Anonymous credentials
  • 8.3.2. Group signatures
  • 8.3.3. Direct anonymous attestations
  • 8.4. References
  • Chapter 9. Key Exchange
  • 9.1. Key exchange fundamentals
  • 9.1.1. Key exchange parties
  • 9.1.2. Key exchange messages
  • 9.1.3. Key derivation functions
  • 9.2. Unauthenticated key exchange
  • 9.2.1. Formal definitions and security models
  • 9.2.2. Constructions and examples
  • 9.3. Authenticated key exchange
  • 9.3.1. Non-interactive key exchange
  • 9.3.2. AKE security models
  • 9.3.3. Constructions and examples
  • 9.4. Conclusion
  • 9.5. References
  • Chapter 10. Password Authenticated Key Exchange: Protocols and Security Models
  • 10.1. Introduction
  • 10.2. First PAKE: EKE
  • 10.3. Game-based model of PAKE security
  • 10.3.1. The BPR security model
  • 10.3.2. Implicit versus explicit authentication
  • 10.3.3. Limitations of the BPR model
  • 10.3.4. EKE instantiated with Diffie-Hellman KE
  • 10.3.5. Implementing ideal cipher on arbitrary groups
  • 10.4. Simulation-based model of PAKE security.
  • 10.4.1. The BMP security model
  • 10.4.2. Advantages of BMP definition: arbitrary passwords, tight security
  • 10.4.3. EKE using RO-derived one-time pad encryption
  • 10.4.4. BMP model for PAKE with explicit authentication (PAKE-EA)
  • 10.5. Universally composable model of PAKE security
  • 10.6. PAKE protocols in the standard model
  • 10.7. PAKE efficiency optimizations
  • 10.8. Asymmetric PAKE: PAKE for the client-server setting
  • 10.9. Threshold PAKE
  • 10.10. References
  • Chapter 11. Verifiable Computation and Succinct Arguments for NP
  • 11.1. Introduction
  • 11.1.1. Background
  • 11.2. Preliminaries
  • 11.3. Verifiable computation
  • 11.4. Constructing VC
  • 11.4.1. VC for circuits in three steps
  • 11.4.2. Succinct non-interactive arguments for non-deterministic computation
  • 11.4.3. Verifiable computation from SNARG
  • 11.5. A modular construction of SNARGs
  • 11.5.1. Algebraic non-interactive linear proofs
  • 11.5.2. Bilinear groups
  • 11.5.3. SNARGs from algebraic NILPs with degree-2 verifiers using bilinear groups
  • 11.6. Constructing algebraic NILPs for arithmetic circuits
  • 11.6.1. Arithmetic circuits
  • 11.6.2. Quadratic arithmetic programs
  • 11.6.3. Algebraic NILP for QAPs
  • 11.7. Conclusion
  • 11.8. References
  • List of Authors
  • Index
  • EULA.

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