The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model
This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to m...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Otros Autores: | , , , , |
| Formato: | Capítulo de libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Paris :
OECD Publishing
2009.
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| Colección: | OECD Economics Department Working Papers,
no.702. |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009706672806719 |
