Debt Overhang, Liquidity Constraints and Adjustment Incentives
Investment in most heavily indebted countries has been weak since 1982. The widely accepted debt overhang proposition interprets the investment drop as a moral hazard problem: a heavy debt burden raises the incentive to consume, because the marginal benefit of investment would go to the creditor. Th...
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| Formato: | Capítulo de libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Paris :
OECD Publishing
1990.
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| Colección: | OECD Development Centre Working Papers,
no.32. |
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| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009705446506719 |
