The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies

The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies

Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in au...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Higashijima, Masaaki (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Ann Arbor, Michigan : University of Michigan Press [2022]
Colección:Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.
Materias:
Elections > Corrupt practices > Case studies.
Elections > Corrupt practices > Kazakhstan.
Elections > Corrupt practices > Kyrgyzstan.
Dictatorship > Case studies.
Dictatorship > Kazakhstan.
Dictatorship > Kyrgyzstan.
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009666934206719
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Part I. Puzzles and arguments
  • Chapter 1. Introduction
  • Chapter 2. A theory of autocratic elections
  • Part II. Cross-national explorations
  • Chapter 3. Blatant electoral fraud
  • Chapter 4. Institutional manipulation
  • Chapter 5. Economic maneuvering
  • Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box
  • Part III. Comparative case studies
  • Chapter 7. From electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan
  • Chapter 8. From electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan
  • Chapter 9. Conclusion.

Ejemplares similares