Modern industrial organization

Written by two of the field's most respected researchers, Modern Industrial Organization goes beyond the traditional structure-conduct-performance framework by using the latest advances in microeconomic theory, including transaction cost analysis, game theory, contestability, and information ec...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores:	Carlton, Dennis W., author (author), Perloff, Jeffrey M., author
Formato:	Libro electrónico
Idioma:	Inglés
Publicado:	Boston : Pearson [2016]
Edición:	Fourth edition, Global edition
Colección:	Always learning.
Materias:	Industrial organization (Economic theory)
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:	https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009663834406719

Tabla de Contenidos:

Cover
Title
Copyright
Brief Contents
Contents
Preface
PART 1 Introduction and Theory
CHAPTER 1 Overview
Models
Price Theory
Transaction Costs
Game Theory
Contestable Markets
Organization
Basic Theory
Market Structures
Business Practices: Strategies and Conduct
Information, Advertising, and Disclosure
Dynamic Models and Market Clearing
Government Policies and Their Effects
CHAPTER 2 The Firm and Costs
The Firm
The Objective of a Firm
Ownership and Control
Mergers and Acquisitions
Reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions
Merger Activity in the United States
Merger Activities in Other Countries
Empirical Evidence on the Efficiency and Profitability of Mergers
Cost Concepts
Types of Costs
Cost Concepts
Economies of Scale
Reasons for Economies of Scale
Total Costs Determine Scale Economies
A Measure of Scale Economies
Empirical Studies of Cost Curves
Economies of Scale in Total Manufacturing Costs
Survivorship Studies
Cost Concepts for Multiproduct Firms
Adaptation of Traditional Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm
Economies of Scope
Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope
Specialization in Manufacturing
An Example of an Industry with Economies of Scope
Summary
Problems
Suggested Readings
APPENDIX 2A Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm
EXAMPLE 2.1 Value of Limited Liability
EXAMPLE 2.2 Conflicts of Interest Between Managers and Shareholders
EXAMPLE 2.3 Specialization of Labor
EXAMPLE 2.4 Indiana Libraries
EXAMPLE 2.5 The Baking Industry
EXAMPLE 2.6 Electricity Minimum Efficient Scale and Scope
PART 2 Market Structures
CHAPTER 3 Competition
Perfect Competition
Assumptions
The Behavior of a Single Firm
The Competitive Market
Elasticities and the Residual Demand Curve.
Elasticities of Demand and Supply
The Residual Demand Curve of Price Takers
Efficiency and Welfare
Efficiency
Welfare
Entry and Exit
Restrictions on Entry
Competition with Few Firms-Contestability
Definition of Barriers to Entry
Identifying Barriers to Entry
The Size of Entry Barriers by Industry
Externalities
Limitations of Perfect Competition
The Many Meanings of Competition
Summary
Problems
EXAMPLE 3.1 Are Farmers Price Takers?
EXAMPLE 3.2 Restrictions on Entry Across Countries
EXAMPLE 3.3 FTC Opposes Internet Bans That Harm Competition
EXAMPLE 3.4 Increasing Congestion
CHAPTER 4 Monopolies, Monopsonies, and Dominant Firms
Monopoly Behavior
Profit Maximization
Market and Monopoly Power
The Incentive for Efficient Operation
Monopoly Behavior over Time
The Costs and Benefits of Monopoly
The Deadweight Loss of Monopoly
Rent-Seeking Behavior
Monopoly Profits and Deadweight Loss Vary with the Elasticity of Demand
The Benefits of Monopoly
Creating and Maintaining a Monopoly
Knowledge Advantage
Government-Created Monopolies
Natural Monopoly
Profits and Monopoly
Is Any Firm That Earns a Positive Profit a Monopoly?
Does a Monopoly Always Earn a Positive Profit?
Are Monopoly Mergers to Eliminate Short-Run Losses Desirable?
Monopsony
Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe
Why Some Firms Are Dominant
The No-Entry Model
The Dominant Firm-Competitive Fringe Equilibrium
A Model with Free, Instantaneous Entry
Summary
Problems
Suggested Readings
EXAMPLE 4.1 Monopoly Newspaper Ad Prices
EXAMPLE 4.2 Monopolizing by Merging
EXAMPLE 4.3 Controlling a Key Ingredient
EXAMPLE 4.4 Preventing Imitation-Cat Got Your Tongue?
EXAMPLE 4.5 Protecting a Monopoly
EXAMPLE 4.6 EU Allows Merger to Eliminate Losses.
EXAMPLE 4.7 Priest Monopsony
EXAMPLE 4.8 Price Umbrella
EXAMPLE 4.9 China Tobacco Monopoly to Become a Dominant Firm
CHAPTER 5 Cartels
Why Cartels Form
Creating and Enforcing the Cartel
Factors That Facilitate the Formation of Cartels
Enforcing a Cartel Agreement
Cartels and Price Wars
Consumers Gain as Cartels Fail
Price-Fixing Laws
Summary
Problems
Suggested Readings
APPENDIX 5A The Effects of Cartel Size
EXAMPLE 5.1 An Electrifying Conspiracy
EXAMPLE 5.2 The Viability of Commodity Cartels
EXAMPLE 5.3 Concrete Example of Government Aided Collusion
EXAMPLE 5.4 Relieving the Headache of Running a Cartel
EXAMPLE 5.5 Vitamins Cartel
EXAMPLE 5.6 How Consumers Were Railroaded
EXAMPLE 5.7 The Social Costs of Cartelization
EXAMPLE 5.8 Prosecuting Global Cartels
CHAPTER 6 Oligopoly
Game Theory
Single-Period Oligopoly Models
Nash Equilibrium
The Cournot Model
The Bertrand Model
The Stackelberg Leader-Follower Model
A Comparison of the Major Oligopoly Models
Multiperiod Games
Single-Period Prisoners' Dilemma Game
Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Game
Types of Equilibria in Multiperiod Games
Experimental Evidence on Oligopoly Models
Summary
Problems
Suggested Readings
APPENDIX 6A A Mathematical Derivation of Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria
APPENDIX 6B Mixed Strategies
EXAMPLE 6.1 Do Birds of a Feather Cournot- Flock Together?
EXAMPLE 6.2 Oligopoly Welfare Losses
EXAMPLE 6.3 Mergers in a Cournot Economy
EXAMPLE 6.4 Roller Coaster Gasoline Pricing
EXAMPLE 6.5 Copying Pricing
EXAMPLE 6.6 Car Wars
CHAPTER 7 Product Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition
Differentiated Products
The Effect of Differentiation on a Firm's Demand Curve
Preferences for Characteristics of Products.
The Representative Consumer Model
A Representative Consumer Model with Undifferentiated Products
A Representative Consumer Model with Differentiated Products
Conclusions About Representative Consumer Models
Location Models
Hotelling's Location Model
Salop's Circle Model
Hybrid Models
Estimation of Differentiated Goods Models
Summary
Problems
Suggested Readings
APPENDIX 7A Welfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Homogeneous Products
APPENDIX 7B Welfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Differentiated Products
EXAMPLE 7.1 All Water Is Not the Same
EXAMPLE 7.2 Entry Lowers Prices
EXAMPLE 7.3 The Jeans Market
EXAMPLE 7.4 A Serial Problem
EXAMPLE 7.5 Combining Beers
EXAMPLE 7.6 Value of Minivans
CHAPTER 8 Industry Structure and Performance
Theories of Price Markups and Profits
Structure-Conduct-Performance
Measures of Market Performance
Rates of Return
Price-Cost Margins
Measures of Market Structure
The Relationship of Structure to Performance
Modern Structure-Conduct-Performance Analysis
Theory
Empirical Research
Modern Approaches to Measuring Performance
Static Studies
Summary
Problems
APPENDIX 8A Relationship Between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Price-Cost Margin
APPENDIX 8B Identifying Market Power
EXAMPLE 8.1 Supermarkets and Concentration
EXAMPLE 8.2 How Sweet It Is
PART 3 Business Practices: Strategies and Conduct
CHAPTER 9 Price Discrimination
Nonuniform Pricing
Incentive and Conditions for Price Discrimination
Profit Motive for Price Discrimination
Conditions for Price Discrimination
Resales
Types of Price Discrimination
Perfect Price Discrimination
Each Consumer Buys More Than One Unit
Different Prices to Different Groups.
Other Methods of Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination
Summary
Problems
Suggested Readings
APPENDIX 9A An Example of Price Discrimination: Agricultural Marketing Orders
EXAMPLE 9.1 Coupons
EXAMPLE 9.2 Thank You, Doctor
EXAMPLE 9.3 Halting Drug Resales from Canada
EXAMPLE 9.4 Vertical Integration as a Means of Price Discrimination: Alcoa Shows Its True Metal
EXAMPLE 9.5 A Discriminating Labor Union
EXAMPLE 9.6 Does Competition Always Lower Price?
CHAPTER 10 Advanced Topics in Pricing
Nonlinear Pricing
A Single Two-Part Tariff
Two Two-Part Tariffs
Tie-in Sales
General Justifications for Tie-in Sales
Tie-in Sales as a Method of Price Discrimination
Package Tie-in Sales of Independent Products
Interrelated Demands
Quality Choice
Other Methods of Nonlinear Pricing
Minimum Quantities and Quantity Discounts
Selection of Price Schedules
Premium for Priority
Auctions
Summary
Problems
APPENDIX 10A The Optimal Two-Part Tariff
APPENDIX 10B Nonlinear Pricing with an Example
EXAMPLE 10.1 Football Tariffs
EXAMPLE 10.2 You Auto Save from Tie-in Sales
EXAMPLE 10.3 Stuck Holding the Bag
EXAMPLE 10.4 Tied to TV
EXAMPLE 10.5 Not Too Suite-Mixed Bundling
EXAMPLE 10.6 Price Discriminating on eBay
CHAPTER 11 Strategic Behavior
Strategic Behavior Defined
Noncooperative Strategic Behavior
Predatory Pricing
Limit Pricing
Investments to Lower Production Costs
Raising Rivals' Costs
Welfare Implications and the Role of the Courts
Cooperative Strategic Behavior
Practices That Facilitate Collusion
Cooperative Strategic Behavior and the Role of the Courts
Summary
Problems
Suggested Readings.
APPENDIX 11A: The Strategic Use of Tie-in Sales and Product Compatibility to Create or Maintain Market Power with Applications to Networks.

Modern industrial organization

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