For the common good : philosophical foundations of research ethics

For the common good philosophical foundations of research ethics

Alex John London defends a conception of the common good that grounds a moral imperative with two requirements. The first is to promote research that enables key social institutions to effectively, efficiently and equitably safeguard the basic interests of individuals. The second is to ensure that r...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: London, Alex John, author (author)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: New York, NY : Oxford University Press 2021.
Colección:Oxford scholarship online.
Materias:
Medical ethics > Philosophy.
Research > Moral and ethical aspects.
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009649940406719
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Intro
  • Half-Title
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • Epigraph
  • PART I: DOES RESEARCH ETHICS REST ON A MISTAKE?
  • 1. Introduction
  • 1.1 Neglected Foundations
  • 1.2 Eight Problematic Commitments
  • 1.2.1 An Inherent Dilemma
  • 1.2.2 From Social Imperative to Private Transaction
  • 1.2.3 Two Main Stakeholders
  • 1.2.4 Research as Functional Role
  • 1.2.5 Two Dogmas of Research Ethics
  • 1.2.6 Paternalistic Foundations
  • 1.2.7 Justice without Social Institutions
  • 1.2.8 Reducing Justice to Mutually Beneficial Agreements
  • 1.3 The Common Good and a Just Social Order
  • 1.3.1 The Basic Interest Conception of the Common Good
  • 1.3.2 Free and Equal Persons
  • 1.3.3 Reconnecting to Social Institutions
  • 1.3.4 Producing a Unique Public Good
  • 1.4 The Egalitarian Research Imperative
  • 1.5 The Integrative Approach to Risk Assessment
  • 1.5.1 Dissolving the Dilemma
  • 1.5.2 The Principle of Equal Concern
  • 1.5.3 Integrating Equal Concern and Social Value
  • 1.6 Non-.Paternalistic Research Ethics
  • 1.7 Justice and the Human Development Approach to International Research
  • 1.8 Conclusion
  • 2. Fear of the Common Good and the Neglect of Justice
  • 2.1 The Practical and Conceptual Origins of Parochialism
  • 2.2 The Peril of Larger Social Purposes
  • 2.2.1 Research as a Progressive Undertaking
  • 2.2.2 Two Sides to the Ledger of Progress
  • 2.2.3 Permission to "Play God"
  • 2.2.4 The Arbitrary Judgments of Men
  • 2.2.5 Fear of Moral Decay
  • 2.3 From Social Imperative to Private Undertaking
  • 2.3.1 Severing Research from the Common Good
  • 2.3.2 An Optional Goal
  • 2.3.3 Frustration without a Viable Alternative
  • 2.4 Functional Characterization of Research
  • 2.4.1 Practical Influences on Research Ethics
  • 2.4.2 The Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Case
  • 2.4.3 The Tuskegee Syphilis Study.
  • 2.4.4 Research versus Treatment
  • 2.4.5 The Ecosystem of Paternalism
  • 2.5 Justice: The Last Virtue of Research Ethics
  • 2.5.1 Justice Untethered
  • 2.5.2 The Consequences of Neglect
  • 2.5.3 Minimalism about Justice: Reducing It to Beneficence and Autonomy
  • 2.5.4 Requirements without Grounds
  • 2.5.5 Protectionism and Neglect
  • 2.6 International Research Stresses Fault Lines
  • 2.6.1 The Zidovudine Short-.Course Controversy
  • 2.6.2 Two Distinctions and Four Standards of Care
  • 2.6.3 The Role-.Related Obligations of Clinicians
  • 2.6.4 Problems for the Global De Jure Standard of Care
  • 2.6.5 Not Just a Problem for International Research
  • 2.6.6 Research Unmoored from a Just Social Order
  • 2.6.7 Responsiveness and Reasonable Availability
  • 2.6.8 The Surfaxin Case
  • 2.6.9 Minimalism about Justice
  • 2.7 Conclusion
  • 3. The Anvil of Neglect and the Hammer of Exploitation: Fault Lines in Research Ethics
  • 3.1 Three Moral Pitfalls
  • 3.2 The Targets of PPE
  • 3.2.1 Norms of Respect
  • 3.2.2 Responsiveness, Reasonable Availability, and the Standard of Care
  • 3.3 The Justification for Permitting Violations of Respect
  • 3.4 Repurposing Shared Values
  • 3.4.1 Beneficence
  • 3.4.2 Respect for Persons and Consent
  • 3.4.3 Options and the Private Sphere
  • 3.5 Permitting Too Much
  • 3.5.1 Undermining Consent
  • 3.5.2 The Participant-.Centered Version
  • 3.5.3 The Impartial Version
  • 3.6 (Un)Equal Respect
  • 3.6.1 Threats to Autonomy and the Integrity of a Life
  • 3.6.2 Providing Assistance and the Fair Division of Moral Labor
  • 3.7 Violating the Proviso
  • 3.8 Taking Stock: Testing the Health of Conceptual Foundations
  • PART II: RESEARCH AMONG EQUALS
  • 4. The Common Good and the Egalitarian Research Imperative
  • 4.1 Revisiting the Common Good
  • 4.2 The Structure of Appeals to the Common Good
  • 4.2.1 Pragmatic Value.
  • 4.2.2 The Implicit Structure of Appeals to the Common Good
  • 4.3 The Corporate Conception of the Common Good
  • 4.3.1 Interests Distinct from Individuals
  • 4.3.2 Strict Triggering Conditions
  • 4.3.3 Lenient Triggering Conditions
  • 4.3.4 Diversity and (Spurious) Consensus
  • 4.4 Problems with the Corporate Conception
  • 4.5 The Basic or Generic Interests Conception of the Common Good
  • 4.5.1 Personal Interests
  • 4.5.2 Basic or Generic Interests
  • 4.5.3 Justice and the Space of Equality
  • 4.5.4 Threats to Basic Interests
  • 4.5.5 Internal Constraints
  • 4.6 Multiple Instances of the Generic Interests View
  • 4.6.1 A Communitarian Formulation
  • 4.6.2 A Purely Political Contractarian Formulation
  • 4.6.3 A Natural Law Formulation
  • 4.6.4 An Institutional Utilitarian Formulation
  • 4.6.5 An Objective Consequentialist Formulation
  • 4.7 The Egalitarian Research Imperative
  • 4.7.1 Stating the Imperative
  • 4.7.2 Grounding the Imperative
  • 4.7.3 The Knowledge Research Produces Is a Public Good
  • 4.7.4 Egalitarian in Two Respects
  • 4.8 A Scheme of Cooperation among Free and Equal Persons
  • 4.8.1 To Whom Does the Imperative Apply?
  • 4.8.2 Prior Moral Claims
  • 4.9 Examples of Neglected Issues
  • 4.10 Conclusion
  • 5. Two Dogmas of Research Ethics
  • 5.1 Is There a Dilemma at the Heart of Research with Humans?
  • 5.2 Incompatible Ends?
  • 5.2.1 The First Dogma: Moral Norms from Role-.Related Obligations
  • 5.2.2 Hippocratic Obligations: Patient-.Centered Consequentialism
  • 5.2.3 The Second Dogma: Research as Inherently Utilitarian
  • 5.2.4 Reasonable Risk: Trading Risk to Some for Benefits to Others
  • 5.3 No Easy Analytic Answers
  • 5.3.1 Two Senses of Incompleteness
  • 5.3.2 The Incompleteness of Medicine
  • 5.3.3 The Incompleteness of Research
  • 5.3.4 If External Constraints Are Unnecessary the Second Dogma Is False.
  • 5.4 Reconciliation through Uncertainty: The Template
  • 5.5 The View of Equipoise That Refuses to Die
  • 5.5.1 The Normative Basis for Appealing to Uncertainty
  • 5.5.2 Whose Uncertainty Matters
  • 5.5.3 Modeling Uncertainty
  • 5.5.4 The Threshold of Uncertainty
  • 5.6 Doomed to Failure
  • 5.6.1 The Fragility of Individual Uncertainty
  • 5.6.2 Permitting Senseless Studies
  • 5.6.3 Conflicting Judgments and Self-.Defeating Requirements
  • 5.6.4 Confusion in the Field: The Uncertainty Principle, Equipoise, and Clinical Equipoise
  • 5.7 The Duty of Care Revisited
  • 5.7.1 Does Clinical Equipoise Address the Wrong Issue?
  • 5.7.2 The Clinical Judgment Principle
  • 5.7.3 A Dilemma for the Clinical Judgment Principle
  • 5.7.4 Conflicts over What Is Medically Irresponsible
  • 5.7.5 Epistemic Humility
  • 5.7.6 Clinical Equipoise and the Particularities of Individual Patients
  • 5.8 Purely Research-.Related Risks
  • 5.8.1 No Uncertainty about Purely Research-.Related Risks
  • 5.8.2 The Clinician-.Centered Formulation
  • 5.8.3 Compromising the Duty of Personal Care
  • 5.8.4 The Participant-.Centered Formulation
  • 5.8.5 Is Research Participation a Prisoner's Dilemma?
  • 5.9 Well-.Being and the Life Plan of Persons
  • 5.9.1 Arbitrarily Restricting Individual Liberty
  • 5.9.2 Personal Risks Are Not Irrational
  • 5.9.3 Study Participation Is Not a Prisoner's Dilemma
  • 5.10 Against the First Dogma of Research Ethics
  • 5.10.1 Hippocratic Duty Has Clear Content but Is Unjustifiably Restrictive
  • 5.10.2 Duty of Care That Respects Autonomy Lacks Independent Content
  • 5.11 Against the Second Dogma of Research Ethics
  • 5.11.1 Utilitarian Assumptions Are Not Necessary
  • 5.11.2 The Principle of Proportionality
  • 5.11.3 The Principle of Utility
  • 6. The Integrative Approach to Assessing and Managing Risk
  • 6.1 Reconciling Social Value and Equal Concern.
  • 6.2 Two Requirements of the Egalitarian Research Imperative
  • 6.2.1 Social Value and the Public Purpose of Research
  • 6.2.2 The Principle of Equal Concern
  • 6.2.3 Justice and the Common Good
  • 6.3 Criteria for Operationalizing Equal Concern
  • 6.3.1 No Unnecessary Risk
  • 6.3.2 Special Concern for Basic Interests
  • 6.3.3 Social Consistency
  • 6.4 Uncertainty as a Practical Test within the Integrative Approach
  • 6.4.1 Uncertainty Regarding Basic Interests
  • 6.4.2 Reconciling Social Value, Concern for Welfare, and Equal Concern: HDC-.ABMT as an Example
  • 6.5 A Social Model of Learning, Uncertainty, and Disagreement
  • 6.5.1 The Most Difficult Case: Response Adaptive Randomization
  • 6.5.2 The Virtue of Rational Expectation
  • 6.5.3 Does Rational Expectation Violate Concern for Welfare?
  • 6.5.4 No Impermissible Gambles
  • 6.5.5 Forcing Uncertainty into the Model of a Single Decision-.Maker
  • 6.6 Modeling a Learning Health System
  • 6.6.1 Reasonable Diversity of Conscientious and Informed Experts
  • 6.6.2 Reconciling Social Value, Concern for Welfare, Equal Concern, and No Impermissible Gambles
  • 6.6.3 More General Relevance of the Result
  • 6.6.4 The Limit of Reasonable Diversity
  • 6.7 The Integrative Approach versus Alternatives
  • 6.7.1 Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Frameworks for Risk Assessment and Management
  • 6.7.2 Other Appeals to Uncertainty and Component Analysis
  • 6.7.3 The Belmont Approach
  • 6.8 Conclusion
  • 7. A Non-.Paternalistic Model of Research Ethics and Oversight
  • 7.1 Introduction
  • 7.2 Democratizing and Legitimating Research as a Social Practice
  • 7.2.1 Social Authority and Abuse
  • 7.2.2 Unnecessary Risks and Inadequate Social Value
  • 7.2.3 Curbing the Arbitrary Exercise of Social Authority
  • 7.3 Preventing a Social Dilemma: The Tragedy of the Commons
  • 7.3.1 The Standard Formulation.
  • 7.3.2 The Tragedy of the Commons in Research.

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