Rugged embedded systems : computing in harsh environments

Rugged embedded systems computing in harsh environments

Rugged Embedded Systems: Computing in Harsh Environments describes how to design reliable embedded systems for harsh environments, including architectural approaches, cross-stack hardware/software techniques, and emerging challenges and opportunities. A "harsh environment" presents inheren...

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Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Vega, Augusto, author (author), Bose, Pradip, author, Buyuktosunoglu, Alper, author
Format: eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: Amsterdam, [Netherlands] : Morgan Kaufmann 2017.
Edition:First edition
Subjects:
Quantum computers.
See on Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009631654506719
Table of Contents:
  • Front Cover
  • Rugged Embedded Systems: Computing in Harsh Environments
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Contributors
  • Preface
  • Chapter 1: Introduction
  • 1. Who This Book Is For
  • 2. How This Book Is Organized
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Chapter 2: Reliable and power-aware architectures: Fundamentals and modeling
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Need for Reliable Computer Systems
  • 2.1. Sustaining Quality of Service in the Presence of Faults, Errors, and Failures
  • 2.2. Processing Phases of Computing System Resiliency
  • 3. Measuring Resilience
  • 3.1. Cost Metrics
  • 3.2. Effectiveness Metrics
  • 4. Metrics on Power-Performance Impact
  • 5. Hard-Error Vulnerabilities
  • 6. Soft-Error Vulnerabilities
  • 6.1. Application Characterization Through Fault Injection
  • 7. Microbenchmark Generation
  • 7.1. Overview
  • 7.2. Example of a Microbenchmark Generation Process
  • 8. Power and Performance Measurement and Modeling
  • 8.1. In-Band Versus Out-of-Band Data Collection
  • 8.2. Processor Performance Counters
  • 8.3. Power Modeling
  • 9. Summary
  • References
  • Chapter 3: Real-time considerations for rugged embedded systems
  • 1. Operating in Harsh Environments
  • 2. Case Study: A Field Programmable Gate Array Prototype for the Validation of Real-Time Algorithms
  • 3. Architecture
  • 3.1. Prototype
  • 3.2. Multiprocessor Interrupt Controller
  • 4. Real-time Support
  • 4.1. MPDP Algorithm
  • 4.2. Implementation Details
  • 5. Evaluation
  • 6. Conclusions
  • References
  • Chapter 4: Emerging resilience techniques for embedded devices
  • 1. Advancing Beyond Static Redundancy and Traditional Fault-Tolerance Techniques
  • 1.1. Comparison of Techniques
  • 1.1.1. Desirable characteristics
  • 1.1.2. Sustainability metrics
  • Fault exploitation
  • Recovery granularity
  • Fault capacity
  • Fault coverage
  • Critical components.
  • 2. Autonomous Hardware-Oriented Mitigation Techniques for Survivable Systems
  • 2.1. Functional Diagnosis of Reconfigurable Fabrics
  • 2.1.1. Reconfiguration Algorithm1: Divide-and-conquer method
  • 2.1.2. Reconfiguration Algorithm2: FaDReS
  • Hardware organization in FaDReS technique
  • Anomaly detection, isolation, and recovery
  • 2.1.3. Reconfiguration Algorithm3: PURE
  • 2.1.4. Reconfiguration Algorithm 4: FHME
  • Fault mitigation strategy
  • Detection of hardware faults
  • Fault diagnosis using dynamic redundancy
  • Phase 1-Identifying a healthy APE
  • Phase 2-Isolation of faulty APEs
  • Fault recovery
  • 2.2. FPGA Refurbishment Using Evolutionary Algorithms
  • 2.2.1. Fault isolation via back tracing
  • 2.2.2. NDER technique
  • 2.2.3. Evaluating the efficacy of NDER approach
  • 2.3. Summary
  • 3. Tradeoffs of Resilience, Quality, and Energy in Embedded Real-Time Computation
  • 3.1. Performance, Power, and Resilience Characterization for FaDReS and PURE Algorithms
  • 3.2. Energy Savings and Fault-Handling Capabality of FHME
  • 3.2.1. Energy saving in reconfigurable design
  • 3.2.2. Online recovery results of FHME core
  • 3.2.3. Comparisons and tradeoffs for TMR vs. DRFI
  • 3.3. Reliability and Energy Tradeoffs at NTV
  • 3.3.1. Soft errors in logic paths
  • 3.3.2. NMR systems at near-threshold voltage
  • 3.3.3. Energy cost of mitigating variability in NMR arrangements
  • 3.3.4. Cost of increased reliability at NTV
  • 3.4. Summary
  • References
  • Chapter 5: Resilience for extreme scale computing
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Resilience in Scientific Applications
  • 3. System-Level Resilience
  • 3.1. User-Level Checkpointing
  • 3.2. Privileged-Level Checkpointing
  • 4. Application-Specific Fault Tolerance Techniques
  • 5. Resilience for Exascale Supercomputers
  • 5.1. Checkpoint/Restart at Exascale
  • 5.2. Flat I/O Bandwidth.
  • 5.3. Task-Based Programming Models
  • 5.4. Performance Anomalies
  • 6. Conclusions
  • References
  • Chapter 6: Security in embedded systems*
  • 1. Not Covered in This Chapter
  • 2. Motivation
  • 2.1. What Is Security?
  • 2.2. Fundamental Principles
  • 2.2.1. Confidentiality
  • 2.2.2. Integrity
  • 2.2.3. Availability
  • 2.3. Threat Model
  • 2.3.1. Vulnerability
  • 2.3.2. Threat
  • 2.3.3. Risk
  • 2.3.4. Asset
  • 2.3.5. Exposure
  • 2.3.6. Safeguard
  • 2.4. Access Control
  • 2.4.1. Identification
  • 2.4.2. Authentication
  • 2.4.3. Authorization
  • 2.4.4. Accountability
  • 2.5. Security Policy
  • 2.6. Why Cyber?
  • 2.7. Why is Security Important?
  • 2.8. Why Are Cyber Attacks so Prevalent and Growing?
  • 2.8.1. Mistakes in software
  • 2.8.2. Opportunity scale created by the Internet
  • 2.8.3. Changing nature of the adversaries
  • 2.8.4. Financial gain opportunities
  • 2.8.5. Ransomware
  • 2.8.6. Industrial espionage
  • 2.8.7. Transformation into cyber warfare
  • 2.9. Why Isnt Our Security Approach Working?
  • 2.9.1. Asymmetrical
  • 2.9.2. Architectural flaws
  • 2.9.3. Software complexity-many vulnerabilities
  • 2.9.4. Complacence, fear, no regulatory pressure to act
  • 2.9.5. Lack of expertise
  • 2.10. What Does This Mean for the IoT Security?
  • 2.11. Attacks Against Embedded Systems
  • 2.11.1. Stuxnet
  • 2.11.2. Flame, Gauss, and Duqu
  • Flame
  • Gauss
  • Duqu
  • 2.11.3. Routers
  • Aviation
  • Automotive
  • Medical
  • Pace makers
  • Diabetes glucose monitors and insulin pumps
  • 2.12. ATM ``Jackpotting´´
  • 2.13. Military
  • 2.14. Infrastructure
  • 2.14.1. Electric grid
  • 2.15. Point-Of-Sale Systems
  • 2.16. Social Engineering
  • 2.16.1. Spoofing email
  • 2.16.2. Phishing
  • 2.16.3. Password guessing
  • 2.17. How Bad Could This Be?
  • 2.17.1. Heartbleed
  • 2.17.2. Shellshock
  • 2.17.3. Blackouts
  • 3. Security &amp
  • Computer Architecture.
  • 3.1. Processor Architectures and Security Flaws
  • 3.2. Solving the Processor Architecture Problem
  • 3.3. Fully Exploiting Metadata Tags
  • 3.4. Processor Interlocks for Policy Enforcement
  • 3.5. Micro-Policies
  • 3.5.1. μ-Policies enforce security
  • 3.5.2. Memory safety μ-policy
  • 3.5.3. Control flow integrity μ-policy
  • 3.5.4. Taint tracking μ-policy
  • 3.5.5. Composite policies
  • 3.6. Self-Protection
  • 3.6.1. Metadata protection
  • 3.6.2. PIPE protection
  • 3.6.3. The Dover processor
  • References
  • Chapter e6: Embedded security
  • 1. Important Security Concepts
  • 1.1. Identification and Registration
  • 1.2. Authentication
  • 1.2.1. Level 1
  • 1.2.2. Level 2
  • 1.2.3. Level 3
  • 1.2.4. Level 4
  • 1.2.5. Multifactor authentication
  • 1.3. Authorization
  • 1.4. Cryptography
  • 1.4.1. Shared key encryption
  • 1.4.2. Public key technologies
  • Public key encryption
  • Digital signature basics
  • Hashing the message to a message digest
  • Public key encryption of the message digest
  • Signature verification
  • Integrity without nonrepudiation
  • 1.4.3. Certificates, CAs, and CA hierarchies-public key infrastructure
  • Digital certificates are containers for public keys
  • Certificate authorities issue (and sign) digital certificates
  • Certificate revocation for dealing with public keys gone bad
  • 1.4.4. SSL Transport Layer Security
  • 1.5. Other Ways to Keep Secrets
  • 1.5.1. One-time pad
  • 1.5.2. Steganography
  • 1.5.3. One-way functions
  • 1.5.4. Elliptic curve cryptography
  • 1.6. Discovering Root Cause
  • 1.6.1. Automatically determining root cause
  • 1.7. Using Diversity for Security [4]
  • 1.8. Defense in Depth
  • 1.9. Least Privilege
  • 1.10. Antitampering
  • 2. Security and Network Architecture
  • 2.1. IPsec
  • 2.1.1. Transport mode
  • 2.1.2. Tunnel mode
  • 2.1.3. VPN
  • 2.1.4. TLS/SSL
  • 2.2. Firewalls
  • 2.3. Intrusion Detection.
  • 2.3.1. Network intrusion-detection systems
  • 2.3.2. Host intrusion-detection systems
  • 2.3.3. Limitations
  • 2.4. Antivirus Systems
  • 2.5. Security Information Management
  • 2.6. Network-Based Attacks
  • 2.6.1. Denial of service (DoS)
  • Types of DoS attacks
  • Internet control message protocol (ICMP) flood
  • (S)SYN flood
  • Distributed denial-of-service
  • 2.6.2. Man-in-the-middle
  • Defenses against the attack
  • 2.7. Introduction-Based Routing [12]
  • 3. Software Vulnerability and Cyber Attacks
  • 3.1. Common Weakness Enumeration
  • 3.2. Common Vulnerability and Exposures
  • 3.3. Who Are the Attackers
  • 3.3.1. Script kiddies
  • 3.3.2. Vandals
  • 3.3.3. Profiteers
  • 3.4. How Do the Attackers Operate?
  • 3.4.1. Zero-day exploits
  • 3.4.2. The good guys vs the bad guys
  • 3.4.3. Vulnerability timeline
  • 3.4.4. RSA attack
  • 3.4.5. Multistage attacks
  • 3.4.6. Advanced persistent threats
  • 3.4.7. Insiders
  • 3.5. How Could We Stop the Attacks?
  • 3.5.1. What would have stopped the Stuxnet attack against SCADA controllers?
  • 3.5.2. What would have stopped the target attack against POS systems?
  • 3.6. Buffer Overflow Attacks
  • 3.6.1. Use of the stack
  • 3.6.2. Real stack overflow attacks
  • 3.6.3. Heap overflow attacks
  • 3.6.4. Stack protection
  • 3.6.5. Writing secure code
  • 3.7. Return-Oriented Programming Attacks
  • 3.7.1. Return-into-library technique
  • 3.7.2. Borrowed code chunks
  • 3.7.3. Attacks
  • 3.7.4. x86 architecture
  • 3.7.5. Defenses
  • 3.8. Code Injection Attacks
  • 3.9. Side-Channel Attacks
  • 3.9.1. Examples
  • 3.9.2. Countermeasures
  • 4. Security and Operating System Architecture
  • 4.1. Least Privilege
  • 4.2. Defense in Depth
  • 4.2.1. Information assurance
  • 4.3. Secure Operating Systems
  • 4.3.1. HardenedBSD
  • 4.3.2. Qubes OS
  • 4.3.3. SELinux
  • 4.3.4. Secure the boot and execution
  • 4.3.5. UEFI.
  • 4.3.6. Coreboot.

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