Handbook of game theory Volume 4 Volume 4 /
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950's. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Priz...
| Other Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
Amsterdam, Netherlands ; Oxford, England :
North-Holland
2015.
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| Edition: | Fourth editions |
| Series: | Handbooks in economics.
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| Subjects: | |
| See on Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009629441706719 |
Table of Contents:
- Front Cover; Handbook of Game Theory; Copyright; Contents; Contributors; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction to the Series; Chapter 1: Rationality; 1.1 Neoclassical Rationality; 1.1.1 Substantive or procedural?; 1.1.1.1 Evolution; 1.1.2 Rationality as consistency; 1.1.3 Positive or normative?; 1.2 Revealed Preference; 1.2.1 Independence of irrelevant alternatives; 1.2.1.1 Aesop; 1.2.1.2 Utility; 1.2.1.3 Causal utility fallacy; 1.2.2 Revealed preference in game theory; 1.3 Decisions under Risk; 1.3.1 VN&M utility functions; 1.3.1.1 Attitudes to risk; 1.3.1.2 Unbounded utility?
- 1.3.1.3 Utilitarianism 1.4 Bayesian Decision Theory; 1.4.1 Savage's theory; 1.4.1.1 Bayes'' rule; 1.4.2 Small worlds; 1.4.2.1 Bayesianism?; 1.4.2.2 Where do Savage's priors come from?; 1.4.2.3 When are the worlds of game theory small?; 1.4.2.4 Common priors?; 1.5 Knowledge; 1.5.1 Knowledge as commitment; 1.5.1.1 Contradicting knowledge?; 1.5.2 Common knowledge; 1.5.3 Common knowledge of rationality?; 1.5.3.1 Counterfactuals; 1.6 Nash Equilibrium; 1.6.1 Evolutionary game theory; 1.6.2 Knowledge requirements; 1.6.3 Equilibrium selection problem; 1.6.3.1 Refinements of Nash equilibrium
- 1.7 Black Boxes 1.7.1 Nash program; 1.7.2 Other pre-play activity; 1.8 Conclusion; Acknowledgments; References; Chapter 2: Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games; 2.1 Introduction; 2.1.1 General model of repeated games (RG); 2.1.2 Compact evaluations; 2.1.3 Asymptotic analysis; 2.1.4 Uniform analysis; 2.2 Recursive Structure; 2.2.1 Discounted stochastic games; 2.2.2 General discounted repeated games; 2.2.2.1 Recursive structure; 2.2.2.2 Specific classes of repeated games; 2.2.3 Compact evaluations and continuous time extension; 2.3 Asymptotic Analysis; 2.3.1 Benchmark model; 2.3.2 Basic results
- 2.3.2.1 Incomplete information 2.3.2.2 Stochastic games; 2.3.3 Operator approach; 2.3.3.1 Nonexpansive monotone maps; 2.3.3.2 Applications to RG; 2.3.4 Variational approach; 2.3.4.1 Discounted values and variational inequalities; 2.3.4.2 General RG and viscosity tools; 2.3.4.3 Compact discounted games and comparison criteria; 2.4 The Dual Game; 2.4.1 Definition and basic results; 2.4.2 Recursive structure and optimal strategies of the non-informed player; 2.4.3 The dual differential game; 2.4.4 Error term, control of martingales, and applications to price dynamics; 2.5 Uniform Analysis
- 2.5.1 Basic results2.5.1.1 Incomplete information; 2.5.1.2 Stochastic games; 2.5.1.3 Symmetric case; 2.5.2 From asymptotic value to uniform value; 2.5.3 Dynamic programming and MDP; 2.5.4 Games with transition controlled by one player; 2.5.5 Stochastic games with signals on actions; 2.5.6 Further results; 2.6 Differential Games; 2.6.1 A short presentation of differential games (DG); 2.6.2 Quantitative differential games; 2.6.3 Quantitative differential games with incomplete information; 2.7 Approachability; 2.7.1 Definition; 2.7.2 Weak approachability and quantitative differential games
- 2.7.3 Approachability and B-sets
