Handbook of public economics. Volume 5

Handbook of public economics Volume 5 Volume 5 /

In the Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 5, top scholars provide context and order to new research about mechanisms that underlie both public finance theories and applications. These fundamental subjects follow the recent, steady movement away from rational decision-making and toward more personali...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Auerbach, Alan, author (author), Auerbach, Alan J. (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Amsterdam : North Holland [2013]
Edición:1st edition
Colección:Handbooks in economics.
Materias:
Finance, Public > Handbooks, manuals, etc.
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009628847506719
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Intro
  • Half Title
  • Title Page
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Introduction to the Series
  • Preface
  • List of Contributors
  • 1. Charitable Giving
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Background: Facts and Figures on Charitable Giving
  • 3 Approach 1: Individuals
  • 3.1 Preferences for Giving
  • 3.2 Analysis of Data on Individual Givers
  • 3.3 Households as Decision Makers
  • 3.4 Experiments on Individual Givers: Price
  • 3.5 Experiments on Individual Givers: Leadership Gifts
  • 3.6 Experiments on Individual Givers: Give more Tomorrow
  • 3.7 The Salience of Incentives to Give
  • 4 Approach 2: The Charitable Sector as a Market
  • 4.1 Theories of Charity from the Supply Side
  • 4.2 Econometric Evidence
  • 4.3 Evidence from Field Experiments
  • 4.4 Further Evidence from Experiments
  • 5 Approach 3: Giving as a Social Act
  • 5.1 Audience Effects
  • 5.2 The Power of the Ask
  • 5.3 Diversity and the Socio-economics of Giving
  • 6 Approach 4: The Giver's Mind
  • 6.1 Social Costs of Social Pressure
  • 6.2 Avoiding the Ask
  • 6.3 Is Fundraising Bad for Society?
  • 7 Fundraising and the Giver's Mind
  • 7.1 Charity Auctions
  • 7.2 Motivational Crowding
  • 7.3 Peer Pressure
  • 7.4 The Giving Habit
  • 7.5 Giving to Disasters
  • 7.6 Giving Bundled with Consuming
  • 8 Conclusion
  • References
  • 2.Taxation and Development
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Perspectives on Taxation and Development
  • 3 Background Facts
  • 4 Framework
  • 5 Drivers of Change
  • 5.1 Economic Development
  • 5.2 Politics
  • 5.3 Value of Public Spending
  • 5.4 Non-Tax Revenues
  • 5.5 Compliance Technologies
  • 6 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 3.Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Motivations for Social Insurance
  • 2.1 Adverse Selection: Review of the Basic Theory
  • 2.1.1 A Stylized Model
  • 2.1.2 The Textbook Case.
  • 2.1.3 Departures from the Textbook Environment: Loads and Preference Heterogeneity
  • 2.2 Empirical Evidence on Selection
  • 2.2.1 Testing for Selection
  • 2.2.2 Evidence on Selection
  • 2.2.3 Welfare Consequences
  • 2.2.4 Directions for Future Work
  • 2.3 Other Motivations
  • 3 Design of Public Insurance Programs
  • 3.1 Optimal Benefit Level in a Static Model
  • 3.2 Sufficient Statistics Implementation
  • 3.2.1 Consumption Smoothing
  • 3.2.2 Liquidity vs. Moral Hazard
  • 3.2.3 Reservation Wages
  • 3.3 Generalizing the Static Model
  • 3.3.1 Dynamics: Endogenous Savings and Borrowing Constraints
  • 3.3.2 Externalities on Private Insurers
  • 3.3.3 Externalities on Government Budgets
  • 3.3.4 Other Externalities
  • 3.3.5 Imperfect Optimization
  • 3.4 Other Dimensions of Policy
  • 3.4.1 Liquidity Provision and Mandated Savings Accounts
  • 3.4.2 Imperfect Takeup
  • 3.4.3 Path of Benefits
  • 4 Challenges for Future Work
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 4.Urban Public Finance
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 The Functions and Powers of City Governments
  • 3 The Core Economics of Urban Government
  • 3.1 The Formation of Cities and their Economies
  • 3.2 Urban Externalities
  • 3.3 Decentralization and Local Government
  • 4 A Model of Local Government Spending and Finances
  • 5 The Financing and Provision of Core Urban Services
  • 5.1 The Appropriate Level of City Services
  • 5.2 The Public and Private Provision Mix
  • 5.3 User Fees vs. Property Taxes vs. Alternative Means of Financing
  • 5.4 Intergovernmental Transfers and Basic City Services
  • 6 Cities, Taxes, and Redistribution
  • 6.1 Migration and Redistribution
  • 6.2 Local Housing Policies
  • 6.3 Public Hospitals and Health Care in Cities
  • 7 Cities, Investment, and Deferred Compensation
  • 7.1 The Timing of Spending by Municipalities
  • 7.2 Infrastructure: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Financing.
  • 7.3 Deferred Expenditures for Operating Expenditures
  • 8 Urban Political Economy
  • 8.1 The Institutions of Local Government
  • 8.2 Mobility, Sorting, and Elections
  • 8.3 Urban Political Machines
  • 9 Conclusion
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 5.The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordination
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Uncoordinated Actions
  • 2.1 Workhorse Models
  • 2.1.1 The Zodrow, Mieszkowski, and Wilson (ZMW) Model
  • 2.1.2 The Kanbur-Keen (KK) Model
  • 2.2 Sequential Decision Making
  • 2.3 Pure Profits and International Portfolio Diversification
  • 2.4 Tax Competition with Multiple Instruments
  • 2.5 Vertical Externalities and the Strategic Role of Internal Governance Structure
  • 3 Coordination
  • 3.1 Asymmetries and the Limits of Harmonization
  • 3.2 Minimum Tax Rates
  • 3.3 Coordination Among a Subset of Countries
  • 3.4 Coordination Across a Subset of Instruments
  • 3.5 Dynamic Aspects
  • 3.5.1 Infinitely Repeated Interaction
  • 3.5.2 Endogenous Savings and Time Consistent Taxation
  • 3.5.3 Stock Effects and Agglomeration
  • 4 Broadening the Perspective
  • 4.1 Bidding for Firms
  • 4.2 Preferential Regimes
  • 4.3 Information Exchange and Implementation of the Residence Principle
  • 4.4 Tax Havens
  • 4.4.1 Which Countries Become Tax Havens?
  • 4.4.2 Are Tax Havens Good or Bad?
  • 4.4.3 Closing Down Tax Havens
  • 4.5 Formula Apportionment
  • 4.6 Political Economy and Agency Issues
  • 4.6.1 Tax Competition and Leviathan
  • 4.6.2 Voters' Choices
  • 5 Concluding Remarks
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • 6.Taxation of Intergenerational Transfers and Wealth
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Overview of Wealth and Estate Taxation in Practice
  • 3 Bequest Motives and Taxation
  • 3.1 Single Generation
  • 3.2 Intergenerational Links
  • 3.3 Normative Issues
  • 4 Redistribution
  • 4.1 Estate Taxation with Externalities from Giving-Intuition.
  • 4.2 Estate Taxation with Giving Externalities-Results
  • 4.3 Accounting for Inheritance Received
  • 4.4 Dynamic Issues and Relationship to Optimal Capital Taxation
  • 5 Behavioral Responses to Transfer Taxation
  • 5.1 Magnitude of Distortions
  • 5.2 Effect on Wealth Accumulation and Reported Estates
  • 5.3 Inter Vivos Giving
  • 5.4 Labor Supply of Recipients
  • 5.5 Entrepreneurship, Family Firms, and Inherited Control
  • 6 Tax Avoidance Responses
  • 6.1 Trade-Off Between Tax Minimization and Control
  • 6.2 Tax Avoidance and Evasion
  • 6.3 Unrealized Capital Gains
  • 7 Other Topics
  • 7.1 Implications for Wealth Distribution and Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality
  • 7.2 Charity
  • 7.3 Other Issues
  • 8 Summary and Conclusions
  • References
  • 7.Optimal Labor Income Taxation
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Background on Actual Tax Systems and Optimal Tax Theory
  • 2.1 Actual Tax Systems
  • 2.2 History of the Field of Optimal Income Taxation
  • 3 Conceptual Background
  • 3.1 Utilitarian Social Welfare Objective
  • 3.2 Fallacy of the Second Welfare Theorem
  • 3.3 Labor Supply Concepts
  • 4 Optimal Linear Taxation
  • 4.1 Basic Model
  • 4.2 Accounting for Actual Tax Rates
  • 4.3 Tax Avoidance
  • 4.4 Income Shifting
  • 5 Optimal Nonlinear Taxation
  • 5.1 Optimal Top Tax Rate
  • 5.1.1 Standard Model
  • 5.1.2 Rent-Seeking Effects
  • 5.1.3 International Migration
  • 5.1.4 Empirical Evidence on Top Incomes and Top Tax Rates
  • 5.2 Optimal Nonlinear Schedule
  • 5.2.1 Continuous Model of Mirrlees
  • 5.2.2 Discrete Models
  • 5.3 Optimal Profile of Transfers
  • 5.3.1 Intensive Margin Responses
  • 5.3.2 Extensive Margin Responses
  • 5.3.3 Policy Practice
  • 6 Extensions
  • 6.1 Tagging
  • 6.2 Supplementary Commodity Taxation
  • 6.3 In-Kind Transfers
  • 6.4 Family Taxation
  • 6.5 Relative Income Concerns
  • 6.6 Other Extensions.
  • 7 Limits of the Welfarist Approach and Alternatives
  • 7.1 Issues with the Welfarist Approach
  • 7.2 Alternatives
  • A.1 Formal Derivation of the Optimal Nonlinear Tax Rate
  • A.2 Optimal Bottom Tax Rate in the Mirrlees Model
  • Appendix
  • Acknowledgments
  • References
  • Index
  • A
  • B
  • C
  • D
  • E
  • F
  • G
  • H
  • I
  • K
  • L
  • M
  • N
  • O
  • P
  • R
  • S
  • T
  • U
  • V
  • W
  • Z.

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