Dynamic models of oligopoly
Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly.
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England] :
Routledge
2001.
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| Edition: | 1st edition |
| Series: | Industrial economics ;
v. 1. |
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| See on Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009628713906719 |
Table of Contents:
- Cover; DYNAMIC MODELS OF OLIGOPOLY; Copyright; CONTENTS; INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. COMPETITION IN TANGIBLE VARIABLES; 3. PREEMPTION; 4. SHORT-RUN COMMITMENT, FIXED COSTS, AND NATURAL MONOPOLIES; 5. PRICE WARS AND TACIT COLLUSION; 6. INVESTING IN DISINFORMATION; REFERENCES; INDEX
