Handbook of financial intermediation and banking
The growth of financial intermediation research has yielded a host of questions that have pushed ""design"" issues to the fore even as the boundary between financial intermediation and corporate finance has blurred. This volume presents review articles on six major topics that a...
| Otros Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Amsterdam ; Boston :
North-Holland/Elsevier
c2008.
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| Edición: | 1st edition |
| Colección: | Handbooks in finance.
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| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009627656006719 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Front Cover; Handbook of Financial Intermediation and Banking; Copyright; Table of Contents; List of Contributors; Preface; Introduction to the Series; Section 1: Design of Contracts and Securities; Chapter 1. The Design of Debt Contracts; 1. Introduction; 2. Debt Contracts and Costly State Verification; 2.1. Multiperiod Contracts; 2.2. Stochastic Monitoring; 3. Debt Contracts and the Allocation of Control Rights; 4. Debt Contracts and the Provision of Incentives; 5. Debt Contracts under Asymmetric Information; 6. The Structure of Debt Contracts; 6.1. Seniority; 6.2. Maturity Structure
- 6.3. Collateral6.4. The Number of Creditors; 7. Concluding Remarks; References; Chapter 2. Subordination Levels in Structured Financing; 1. Introduction; 2. Structured Financing and the Pooling and Tranching of Assets; 3. CMBS Structure; 3.1. CMBS Subordination; 4. Research Question and Empirical Approach; 4.1. The Deal Subordination Regression; 4.2. The Chow Test for Structural Change; 5. Data; 6. Results; 6.1. Regression Results; 6.2. Structural Change and Chow Tests; 7. Conclusion; References; Section 2: Market Structure and Structure of Financial Markets
- Chapter 3. Limit Order Markets: A Survey1. Introduction; 2. Modeling Limit Orders; 2.1. Static Equilibrium Models; 2.2. Equilibrium Models with Static Order Choice and a Terminal Penalty; 2.3. Dynamic Optimal Control Models for Single Agents; 2.4. Multiperiod Equilibrium Models; 2.5. Limit Orders and Private Information; 3. Market Design; 3.1. Competition and Limit Order Markets; 3.2. Imperfect Competition; 3.3. Dealer Markets; 3.4. Welfare; 3.5. Robustness; 3.6. Transparency; 4. Questions for Future Research; References; Section 3: Financial Intermediary Structure
- Chapter 4. Bank Structure and Lending: What We Do and Do Not Know1. Introduction; 2. Bank Size and Lending; 2.1. Do Large Banks Lend More Than Small?; 2.2. Do Large Banks Lend Differently from Small Banks?; 2.3. Bank Size, Organization Structure, and Lending; 2.4. How Does Bank Size Affect Credit Availability?; 3. Deposit-Lending Synergies; 3.1. Do Deposits Make Banks Better Lenders?; 3.2. Banks as Liquidity Providers; 4. Conclusion; References; Chapter 5. Optimal Industrial Structure in Banking; 1. Introduction and Motivation; 2. Efficiency Concepts; 3. Empirical Implementation
- 3.1. Bank Production3.2. Cost Minimization; 3.3. Profit Maximization; 3.4. More Complicated Objectives; 4. Measurement; 4.1. Estimation Techniques; 4.2. Functional Form, Variable Selection, and Variable Measurement; 4.3. Special Issues in Banking; 5. Empirical Findings in the Literature; 5.1. Scale Economies; 5.2. Scope Economies; 5.3. X-Efficiency; 5.4. Productivity; 6. Conclusion; References; Chapter 6. Commercial Banks in Investment Banking; 1. Introduction; 2. Tradeoffs in Combining Lending and Underwriting; 2.1. Costs of Combining Lending and Underwriting
- 2.2. Benefits of Combining Lending and Underwriting
