Auction theory
Vijay Krishna's 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Boston :
Elsevier Academic Press
2009.
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| Edición: | 2nd ed |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009627532506719 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Front Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication Page; Table of Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; 1.1 Some Common Auction Forms; 1.2 Valuations; 1.3 Equivalent Auctions; 1.4 Revenue versus Efficiency; 1.5 What Is an Auction?; 1.6 Outline of Part I; Part I: Single-Object Auctions; Chapter 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look; 2.1 The Symmetric Model; 2.2 Second-Price Auctions; 2.3 First-Price Auctions; 2.4 Revenue Comparison; 2.5 Reserve Prices; Chapter 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle; 3.1 Main Result; 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle
- 3.2.1 Unusual Auctions3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders; Chapter 4. Qualifications and Extensions; 4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders; 4.2 Budget Constraints; 4.2.1 Second-Price Auctions; 4.2.2 First-Price Auctions; 4.2.3 Revenue Comparison; 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders; 4.3.1 Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders; 4.3.2 Revenue Comparison; 4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison; 4.4 Resale and Efficiency; Chapter 5. Mechanism Design; 5.1 Mechanisms; 5.1.1 The Revelation Principle; 5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility; 5.1.3 Individual Rationality; 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms; 5.2.1 Setup; 5.2.2 Solution
- 5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms; 5.3 Efficient Mechanisms; 5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism; 5.3.2 Budget Balance; 5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade; Chapter 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values; 6.1 The Symmetric Model; 6.2 Second-Price Auctions; 6.3 English Auctions; 6.4 First-Price Auctions; 6.5 Revenue Comparisons; 6.5.1 English versus Second-Price Auctions; 6.5.2 Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions; 6.6 Efficiency; Chapter 7. The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; 7.1 The Main Result; 7.2 Public Information; 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle
- Chapter 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle; 8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions; 8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders; 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees; Chapter 9. Efficiency and the English Auction; 9.1 The Single Crossing Condition; 9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions; 9.3 The Average Crossing Condition; 9.4 Three or More Bidders; 9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2; 9.6 Miscellany; Chapter 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; 10.1 Efficient Mechanisms; 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms; Chapter 11. Bidding Rings
- 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions11.1.1 Efficient Collusion; 11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion; 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions; Part II: Multiple-Object Auctions; Chapter 12. An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions; 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units; 12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions; 12.1.2 Uniform-Price Auctions; 12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions; 12.2 Some Open Auctions; 12.2.1 Dutch Auctions; 12.2.2 English Auctions; 12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions; Chapter 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; 13.1 The Basic Model; 13.2 Vickrey Auctions
- 13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions
