What went wrong? case histories of process plant disasters and how they could have been avoided

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Kletz, Trevor A. (-)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: London : Elsevier 2009.
Edición:5th ed
Materias:
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009627505506719
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Front Cover
  • What Went Wrong?
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • Preface
  • Units and Nomenclature
  • PART A: WHAT WENT WRONG?
  • Chapter 1. Preparation for Maintenance
  • 1.1 Isolation
  • 1.2 Identification
  • 1.3 Removal of Hazards
  • 1.4 Procedures Not Followed
  • 1.5 Quality of Maintenance
  • 1.6 A Personal Note
  • Chapter 2. Modifications
  • 2.1 Startup Modifications
  • 2.2 Minor Modifications
  • 2.3 Modifications Made during Maintenance
  • 2.4 Temporary Modifications
  • 2.5 Sanctioned Modifications
  • 2.6 Process Modifications
  • 2.7 New Tools
  • 2.8 Organizational Changes
  • 2.9 Gradual Changes
  • 2.10 Modification Chains
  • 2.11 Modifications Made to Improve the Environment
  • 2.12 Control of Modifications
  • Chapter 3. Accidents Said to Be Due to Human Error
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Accidents That Could Be Prevented by Changing the Plant Design or Method of Working
  • 3.3 Accidents That Could Be Prevented by Better Training
  • Chapter 4. Labeling
  • 4.1 Labeling of Equipment
  • 4.2 Labeling of Instruments
  • 4.3 Labeling of Chemicals
  • 4.4 Labels Not Understood
  • Chapter 5. Storage Tanks
  • 5.1 Overfilling
  • 5.2 Overpressuring
  • 5.3 Sucking In
  • 5.4 Explosions
  • 5.5 Floating-Roof Tanks
  • 5.6 Miscellaneous Incidents
  • 5.7 Fiberglass-Reinforced (FRP) Tanks
  • Chapter 6. Stacks
  • 6.1 Stack Explosions
  • 6.2 Blocked Stacks
  • 6.3 Heat Radiation
  • Chapter 7. Leaks
  • 7.1 Some Common Sources of Leaks
  • 7.2 Control of Leaks
  • 7.3 Leaks onto Water, Wet Ground, or Insulation
  • 7.4 Detection of Leaks
  • 7.5 Fugitive Emissions
  • Chapter 8. Liquefied Flammable Gases
  • 8.1 Major Leaks
  • 8.2 Minor Leaks
  • 8.3 Other Leaks
  • 8.4 Safety in the Design of Plants Handling Liquefied Light Hydrocarbons
  • Chapter 9. Pipe and Vessel Failures
  • 9.1 Pipe Failures
  • 9.2 Pressure Vessel Failures.
  • Chapter 10. Other Equipment
  • 10.1 Centrifuges
  • 10.2 Pumps
  • 10.3 Air Coolers
  • 10.4 Relief Valves
  • 10.5 Heat Exchangers
  • 10.6 Cooling Towers
  • 10.7 Furnaces
  • Chapter 11. Entry to Vessels
  • 11.1 Vessels Not Freed from Hazardous Material
  • 11.2 Hazardous Materials Introduced
  • 11.3 Vessels Not Isolated from Sources of Danger
  • 11.4 Unauthorized Entry
  • 11.5 Entry into Vessels with Irrespirable Atmospheres
  • 11.6 Rescue
  • 11.7 Analysis of Vessel Atmosphere
  • 11.8 What Is a Confined Space?
  • 11.9 Every Possible Error
  • Chapter 12. Hazards of Common Materials
  • 12.1 Compressed Air
  • 12.2 Water
  • 12.3 Nitrogen
  • 12.4 Heavy Oils (Including Heat Transfer Oils)
  • Chapter 13. Tank Trucks and Cars
  • 13.1 Overfilling
  • 13.2 Burst Hoses
  • 13.3 Fires and Explosions
  • 13.4 Liquefied Flammable Gases
  • 13.5 Compressed Air
  • 13.6 Tipping Up
  • 13.7 Emptying into or Filling from the Wrong Place
  • 13.8 Contact with Live Power Lines
  • Chapter 14. Testing of Trips and Other Protective Systems
  • 14.1 Testing Should Be Thorough
  • 14.2 All Protective Equipment Should Be Tested
  • 14.3 Testing Can Be Overdone
  • 14.4 Protective Systems Should Not Reset Themselves
  • 14.5 Trips Should Not Be Disarmed without Authorization
  • 14.6 Instruments Should Measure Directly What We Need to Know
  • 14.7 Trips Are for Emergencies, Not for Routine Use
  • 14.8 Tests May Find Faults
  • 14.9 Some Miscellaneous Incidents
  • 14.10 Some Accidents at Sea
  • Chapter 15. Static Electricity
  • 15.1 Static Electricity from Flowing Liquids
  • 15.2 Static Electricity from Gas and Water Jets
  • 15.3 Static Electricity from Powders and Plastics
  • 15.4 Static Electricity from Clothing
  • Chapter 16. Materials of Construction
  • 16.1 Wrong Material Used
  • 16.2 Hydrogen Produced by Corrosion
  • 16.3 Other Effects of Corrosion
  • 16.4 Loss of Protective Coatings.
  • 16.5 Some Other Incidents Caused by Corrosion
  • 16.6 Fires
  • 16.7 Choosing Materials
  • Chapter 17. Operating Methods
  • 17.1 Trapped Pressure
  • 17.2 Clearing Choked Lines
  • 17.3 Faulty Valve Positioning
  • 17.4 Responsibilities Not Defined
  • 17.5 Communication Failures
  • 17.6 Work at Open Manholes
  • 17.7 One Line, Two Duties
  • 17.8 Inadvertent Isolation
  • 17.9 Incompatible Storage
  • 17.10 Maintenance: Is It Really Necessary?
  • 17.11 An Interlock Failure
  • 17.12 Emulsion Breaking
  • 17.13 Chimney Effects
  • Chapter 18. Reverse Flow, Other Unforeseen Deviations, and Hazop
  • 18.1 Reverse Flow from a Product Receiver or Blowdown Line Back into the Plant
  • 18.2 Reverse Flow into Service Mains
  • 18.3 Reverse Flow through Pumps
  • 18.4 Reverse Flow from Reactors
  • 18.5 Reverse Flow from Drains
  • 18.6 Other Deviations
  • 18.7 A Method for Foreseeing Deviations
  • 18.8 Some Pitfalls in Hazop
  • 18.9 Hazop of Batch Plants
  • 18.10 Hazop of Tank Trucks
  • 18.11 Hazop: Conclusions
  • Chapter 19. I Didn't Know That…
  • 19.1 Ammonia Can Explode
  • 19.2 Hydraulic Pressure Tests Can Be Hazardous
  • 19.3 Diesel Engines Can Ignite Leaks
  • 19.4 Carbon Dioxide Can Ignite a Flammable Mixture
  • 19.5 Mists Can Explode
  • 19.6 The Source of the Problem Lay Elsewhere
  • Chapter 20. Problems with Computer Control
  • 20.1 Hardware and Software Faults
  • 20.2 Treating the Computer as a Black Box
  • 20.3 Misjudging the Way Operators Will Respond
  • 20.4 Other Problems
  • 20.5 Unauthorized Interference
  • 20.6 New Applications
  • 20.7 Conclusions
  • Chapter 21. Inherently Safer Design
  • 21.1 Bhopal
  • 21.2 Other Examples of Inherently Safer Design
  • 21.3 User-Friendly Design
  • Chapter 22. Reactions-Planned and Unplanned
  • 22.1 Lack of Knowledge
  • 22.2 Poor Mixing
  • 22.3 Contamination
  • 22.4 Reactions with Auxiliary Materials.
  • 22.5 Poor Training or Procedures
  • 22.6 Use-By Dates
  • PART B: STILL GOING WRONG
  • Chapter 23. Maintenance
  • 23.1 Inadequate Preparation on a Distant Plant
  • 23.2 Precautions Relaxed Too Soon
  • 23.3 Failure to Isolate Results in a Fire
  • 23.4 Unintentional Isolation
  • 23.5 Bad Practice and Poor Detailed Design
  • 23.6 Dismantling
  • 23.7 Commissioning
  • 23.8 Other Hidden Hazards
  • 23.9 Changes in Procedure
  • 23.10 Dead-Ends
  • Chapter 24. Entry into Confined Spaces
  • 24.1 Incomplete Isolation
  • 24.2 Hazardous Materials Introduced
  • 24.3 Weaknesses in Protective Equipment
  • 24.4 Poor Analysis of Atmosphere
  • 24.5 When Does a Space Become Confined?
  • 24.6 My First Entry and a Gasholder Explosion
  • 24.7 Failure of a Complex Procedure
  • 24.8 Epidemics of Unsafe Entries
  • Chapter 25. Changes to Processes and Plants
  • 25.1 Changes to Processes
  • 25.2 Changes to Plant Equipment
  • 25.3 Gradual Changes
  • 25.4 Changes Made Because the Reasons for Equipment or Procedures Has Been Forgotten
  • Chapter 26. Changes in Organization
  • 26.1 An Incident at an Ethylene Plant
  • 26.2 The Longford Explosion
  • 26.3 The Texas City Explosion
  • 26.4 Outsourcing
  • 26.5 Multiskilling and Downsizing
  • 26.6 How to Lose Your Reputation
  • 26.7 Administrative Convenience versus Good Science
  • 26.8 The Control of Managerial Modifications
  • 26.9 Some Points a Guide Sheet Should Cover
  • 26.10 Afterthoughts
  • Chapter 27. Changing Procedures Instead of Designs
  • 27.1 Misleading Valve Layouts
  • 27.2 Simple Redesign Overlooked
  • 27.3 Unimaginative Thinking
  • 27.4 Just Telling People to Follow the Rules
  • 27.5 Don't Assemble It Incorrectly
  • 27.6 Tighten Correctly or Remove the Need
  • 27.7 Should Improvements to Procedures Ever Be the First Choice?
  • Chapter 28. Materials of Construction (Including Insulation)
  • 28.1 Rust
  • 28.2 Insulation.
  • 28.3 Brittle Failure
  • 28.4 Wrong Materials of Construction
  • 28.5 Corrosion Sends a Column into Orbit
  • 28.6 Unexpected Corrosion
  • 28.7 Another Failure to Inspect Pipework
  • 28.8 How Not to Write an Accident Report
  • Chapter 29. Operating Methods
  • 29.1 The Alarm Must Be False
  • 29.2 A Familiar Accident-But Not as Simple as It Seemed
  • 29.3 More Reluctance to Believe the Alarm
  • 29.4 The Limitations of Instructions
  • 29.5 The Limitations of Instructions Again
  • 29.6 Empty Plant That Is Out of Use
  • 29.7 A Minor Job Forgotten-Until There Was a Leak
  • 29.8 Design Error + Construction Error + Operating Error = Spillage
  • Chapter 30. Explosions
  • 30.1 An Explosion in a Gas-Oil Tank
  • 30.2 Another Sort of Explosion
  • 30.3 One + One = More Than Two
  • 30.4 "Near Enough Is Good Enough
  • 30.5 Another Explosion Ignited by a Carbon Bed
  • 30.6 An Explosion in an Alternative to a Carbon Bed
  • 30.7 Only a Minor Change
  • 30.8 An Explosion in a Pipe
  • 30.9 A Dust Explosion in a Duct
  • 30.10 Obvious Precautions Neglected
  • 30.11 A Drum Explosion
  • 30.12 Foam-Over-The Cinderella of the Oil and Chemical Industries
  • 30.13 Explosions of Cold Gasoline in the Open Air
  • 30.14 The Inevitability of Ignition
  • Chapter 31. Poor Communication
  • 31.1 What Is Meant by Similar?
  • 31.2 More Similar Errors
  • 31.3 Wrong Material Delivered
  • 31.4 Packaged Deals
  • 31.5 "Draftsmen's Delusions
  • 31.6 Same Plant and Product, but No Communication
  • 31.7 A Failure at the Design/Construction Interface
  • 31.8 Failure of Communication between Marketing and Technology
  • 31.9 Too Much Communication
  • 31.10 No One Told the Designers
  • 31.11 Conclusions
  • Chapter 32. I Did Not Know…
  • 32.1 … That Metals Can Burn
  • 32.2 … That Aluminum Is Dangerous When Wet
  • 32.3 … That Rubber and Plastics Are Permeable.
  • 32.4 … That Some Plastics Can Absorb Process Materials and Swell.