Negotiating asylum the EU acquis, extraterritorial protection, and the common market of deflection
How is access to asylum and other forms of extraterritorial protection regulated in the European Union? Is the EU acquis in these areas in conformity with international law? Which tools does international law offer to solve collisions between both? And, finally, is law capable of bridging the founda...
| Otros Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
The Hague :
Brill
2000
[2000] |
| Edición: | 1st ed |
| Colección: | Raoul Wallenberg Institute human rights library.
|
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009605743506719 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Intro
- Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
- STRUCTURE
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
- ABBREVIATIONS
- 1 INTRODUCTION
- 1.1. Reminiscences from a Continuing Past
- 1.1.1 Protecting Communities I
- 1.1.2 Protecting Communities II
- 1.1.3 Protecting Communities Ill
- 1.1.4 The Ambiguity of Hindsight
- 1.2 Identifying the Problem
- 1.3 Delimiting the Problem
- 1.3.1 'Access'
- 1.3.2 'Extraterritorial Protection'
- 1.3.3 'Regulated'
- 1.3.4 'In the European Union'
- 1.4 Identifying Law
- 1.4.1 International Law
- 1.4.1.1 The Concept of 'International Law'
- 1.4.1.2 Sources of International Law
- 1.4.1.3 Normative Hierarchies within International Law
- 1.4.1.4 International Law and Justiciability Advantages
- 1.4.2 The Law of the European Union
- 1.4.2.1 Terminology
- 1.4.2.2 Primary and Secondary Law of the European Union
- 1.4.2.3 EC Law and Union Law: Conceptual Questions
- 1.4.2.4 EC Law: Sources and Normative Hierarchies
- 1.4.2.5 EC Law and Justiciability Advantages
- 1.4.2.6 Union law: Sources, Normative Hierarchies and Justiciability Advantages
- 1.4.2. 7 A Normative Hierarchy between EC Law, Union Law and International Law?
- 1.4.3 Intermediary Conclusion
- 1.5 Determining Law-Methodological Considerations
- 1.5.1 A Triple Dilemma
- 1.5.2 Structuring Conflicts
- 1.5.3 The Legal-technical Level
- 1.5.4 The Qualitative Level
- 1.5.5 The Metalega/ Leve/
- 1.6 The Structure of Inquiry
- 2 UNIVERSALISM VERSUS PARTICULARISM
- 2.1 Choosing between Torture and Terrorism: Mr. Chahal vs. the U.K. Population
- 2.2 Universalism
- 2.3 Particularism
- 2.4 Human Rights versus Sovereignty
- 2.5 Artefact versus Organism
- 2.6 Meandering Arguments
- 3 DETERMINANTS OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS.
- 3.1 The State Perspective
- 3.2 The Perspective of the Protection Seeker
- 3.2.1 Access to Territory
- 3.2.2 Access to FulI-fledged Procedures
- 3.2.3 Access to Protection
- 3.3 Two Loops
- 4 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EXTRATERRITORIAL PROTECTION
- 4.1. The Real World: Flight Movements to and within Europe since 1985
- 4.2 The Institutional World: From Schengen to Amsterdam
- 4.2.1 Freedom through Control: The 1985 White Paper and the Single European Act4.2.1 Freedom through Control: The 1985 White Paper and the Single European Act
- 4.2.2 L'Europe acceleree: Schengen4.2.2 L'Europe acceleree: Schengen
- 4.2.3 Trying to Catch Up: The European Political Cooperation
- 4.2.3.1 The Dublin Convention
- 4.2.3.2 The Draft External Border Convention
- 4.2.3.3 Enter Soft Law: The London Resolutions
- 4.2.3.4 Swapping Information: CIREA and CIREFI
- 4.2.4 Maastricht-Progress through Split Competencies?
- 4.2.5 Planning the Economy of Harmonization: Amsterdam
- 4.2.5.1 Competencies and Obligations
- 4.2.5.2 Decision Making under Title IV
- 4.2.5.3 The Role of the ECJ
- 4.2.5.4 The Position of Denmark, Ireland and the U.K.
- 4.2.6 The Integration of the Schengen acquis
- 4.2.7 The Variable Geometry of Integration
- 4.2.8 Enlarging the Union
- 4.3 Conclusion
- 5 ACCESS TO TERRITORY UNDER THE EU ACQUIS
- 5.1 Pre-entry Measures
- 5.1.1 The Harmonisation of Visa Regimes
- 5.1.1.1 Visa Harmonisation in the EU
- 5.1.1.2 Visa Harmonisation in the Schengen Group
- 5.1.1.3 Mainstreaming the Schengen Visa acquis: The Commission Proposal
- 5.1.2 Measures Complementing Visa Regimes
- 5.1.2.1 Carrier Sanctions
- 5.1.2.2 Sanctions against Human Smugglers
- 5.1.2.3 Pre-frontier Assistance and Training
- 5.1.3 Conclusion
- 5.2 Post-entry Measures: The Concept of Safe Third Countries
- 5.2.1 Allocation to other Member States.
- 5.2.1.1 The Dublin Convention
- 5.2.1.2 Complementing Dublin: The Eurodac Proposal
- 5.2.2 Allocation to Non-Member States
- 5.2.2.1 The 1992 Resolution on Host Third Countries
- 5.2.2.2 Complementing Allocation to Non-Member States: Readmission Agreements
- 5.2.2.2.1 The EU acquis on Readmission
- 5.2.2.2.2 Competencies after Amsterdam
- 5.2.3 Conclusion
- 6 ACCESS TO FULL-FLEDGED PROCEDURES UNDER THE EU ACQUIS
- 6.1 The EU acquis Related to Procedure
- 6.2 The Spanish Protocol
- 6.3 Competencies after Amsterdam
- 6.4 Conclusion
- 7 ACCESS TO PROTECTION UNDER THE EU ACQUIS
- 7.1. Protection Categories
- 7.1.1 The EU Acquis Related to Protection Categories: Questions of Scope
- 7.1.2 The Substantial Content of the Refugee Joint Position
- 7.1.3 Competencies after Amsterdam
- 7.1.4 Conclusion
- 7.2 Return
- 7.2.1 The EU acquis Related to Return
- 7.2.2 The Schengen acquis Related to Return
- 7.2.3 Competencies after Amsterdam
- 7.2.4 Assessment of the EU acquis Related to Return
- 7.3 Intermediary Conclusion: Access to Protection in the EU
- 8 SHARING THE BURDEN?
- 8.1. The Concept and Function of Burden-sharing
- 8.1.1 The Objective of Burden-sharing
- 8.1.2 The Scope of Burden-sharing
- 8.1.2.1 Sharing Norms
- 8.1.2.2 Sharing Money
- 8.1.2.3 Sharing People
- 8.1.3 Assessing Burden-sharing Schemes
- 8.2 Burden-sharing and International Law
- 8.3 Burden-sharing and the EU acquis
- 8.3.1 Negotiations Preceding the 1995 Resolution
- 8.3.2 Comparison of the German Draft and the 1995 Resolution
- 8.3.3 The Impact of the Treaty of Amsterdam
- 8.3.4 The Solidarity Drafts: Merging Admission and Burden-sharing?
- 8.3.5 The Experimental Instruments of 1997 to 1999
- 8.3.6 The Proposal on a European Refugee Fund
- 8.4 Concentrating the Burden
- 8.4.1 Concentration Effects of the Dublin Convention.
- 8.4.2 Concentration Effects of Safe Third Country- Arrangements
- 8.5 Two Interpretive Approaches
- 8.5.1 Subsidiarity
- 8.5.2 Game Theory
- 8.6 Conclusion
- 9 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXTRATERRITORIAL PROTECTION
- 9.1 Protection
- 9.1.1 A Right to Seek and Enjoy Asylum?
- 9.1.2 Express Prohibitions of Refoulement in Human Rights Law
- 9.1.2.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention
- 9.1.2.2 The 1984 CAT
- 9.1.2.3 Other Express Prohibitions of Refou/ement in Human Rights law?
- 9.1.3 Express Prohibitions of Refoulement in Humanitarian Law
- 9.1.4 Implicit Prohibitions of Refoulement in Treaty Law
- 9.1.4.1 Human Rights Law
- 9.1.4.2 Humanitarian Law
- 9.2 Access to Territory
- 9.2.1 The ICCPR
- 9.2.2 The Fourth Protocol to the ECHR
- 9.3 Methodology of Interpretation
- 9.4 Identifying Hard Cases
- 9.4.1 Protection: Implicit Prohibitions of Refoulement
- 9.4.1.1 Article 3 ECHR and Article 7 ICCPR
- 9.4.1.2 Article 32 FC
- 9.4.2 Access to Territory
- 9.4.2.1 The Right to Leave and the Right to Entry
- 9.4.2.2 Explicit Prohibitions of Refoulement
- 9.4.2.3 Implicit Right to Access
- 9.4.3 Interim Conclusion on the First Stage
- 10 INTERPRETING HARD CASES
- 10.1 Protection: Implicit Prohibitions of Refoulement
- 10.1.1 Article 3 ECHR
- 10.1.1.1 The Reasoning of the European Organs
- 10.1.1.2 Two Critics of the European Organs
- 10.1.1.3 Methodological Appraisal
- 10.1.1.4 Reinterpreting Article 3 ECHR
- 10.1.2 Article 7 ICCPR
- 10.2 Access to Territory
- 10.2.1 The Right to Leave and the Right to Entry
- 10.2.1.1 A Universalist Reading
- 10.2.1.2 A Particularist Reading
- 10.2.1.2.1 Complementing the Second Stage
- 10.2.1.2.2 The Third Stage
- 10.2.2 Explicit Prohibitions of Refoulement
- 1.0.2.2.1. Article 33 GC
- 10.2.2.1.1 The Second and Third Stage in the Light of Doctrinal Debate.
- 10.2.2.1.2 Article 33 GC in the Light of the Dublin Convention
- 10.2.2.1.3 Conclusion
- 10.2.2.2 Article 3 CAT
- 10.2.2.2.1 The Second Stage
- 10.2.2.2.2 The Third Stage
- 10.2.2.3 Article 45 FC
- 10.2.3 Implicit Prohibitions of Refoulement
- 10.2.3.1 Article 7 ICCPR
- 10.2.3.2 Article 3 ECHR
- 10.3 Interim Conclusion on Hard Cases
- 10.4 Substance by Method?
- 10.4.1 What Does the Vienna Convention Do To the Law?
- 10.4.2 What Do Lawyers Do With the Vienna Convention?
- 10.4.3 Three Wildcards: Presumptions, Telos and Indeterminacy
- 11. DELIMITING AND JUSTIFYING PROTECTION UNDER THE ECHR
- 11.1 The Case Law of the European Organs
- 11.2 A Hierarchy among Rights?
- 11.3 lrreparability as a Water-Shed?
- 11.4 A Hierarchy within Rights: The Concept of Positive Obligations
- 11.5 Conclusion
- 12 THREE CONFLICT ZONES
- 12.1 Access to Territory: Visa Requirements and the ECHR
- 12.1.1 Determinants of Discrimination Arguments
- 12.1.2 Discrimination under the ECHR?
- 12.1.3 Refining Proportionality Reasoning
- 12.1.4 Applying the Refined Proportionality Test to Visa Requirements
- 12.1.5 Appraisal
- 12.2 Access to Territory and Protection: Choosing between Dublin and Geneva?
- 12.2.1 Permissive Tolerance, Margin of Discretion or Unitary Interpretation?
- 12.2.2 Delimiting Protection Categories: Persecution by Third Parties
- 12.2.2.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention
- 12.2.2.2 The CAT
- 12.2.2.3 The ECHR
- 12.2.3 Appraisal
- 12.3 Access to Full-Fledged Procedures: The Spanish Protocol and Discrimination
- 12.3.1 Interpreting the Spanish Protocol in the Light of International Law
- 12.3.2 Discrimination under the 1951 Refugee Convention?
- 12.3.4 Discrimination under the TEC?
- 12.3.5 Appraisal
- 12.4 Conclusion
- 13 DEMOS, DETERMINACY AND JUSTIFICATION
- 13.1 Tilting the Balance: Constructions of the Demos.
- 13.1.1 The European Union and the Demos Dilemma.
