Groups, rules and legal practice
Ever since Hart´s The Concept of Law, legal philosophers agree that the practice of law-applying officials is a fundamental aspect of law. Yet there is a huge disagreement on the nature of this practice. Is it a conventional practice? Is it like the practice that takes place, more generally, when th...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
New York :
Springer
2010.
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| Series: | Law and philosophy library ;
v. 89. |
| Subjects: | |
| See on Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009450865906719 |
Table of Contents:
- Three Tests
- Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (I): Hart’s Account and the Coordinative-Convention Approach
- Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (II): Raz’s Account
- Collective Intentional Activities: Shapiro’s Model
- Kutz on Collective Intentional Activities. Building an Alternative Model: Groups Which Act with No Normative Unity
- The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type (I). Non-developed Instances of Legal Practice
- Gilbert’s Account of Collective Activities
- On Agreements
- The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type II. Other-Regarding, Developed Institutions. Developed Instances of the Judiciary
- Developed Instances of Legal Practice. Meeting the Tests.
