Groups, rules and legal practice

Ever since Hart´s The Concept of Law, legal philosophers agree that the practice of law-applying officials is a fundamental aspect of law. Yet there is a huge disagreement on the nature of this practice. Is it a conventional practice? Is it like the practice that takes place, more generally, when th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sanchez Brigido, Rodrigo E. 1973- (-)
Format: eBook
Language:Inglés
Published: New York : Springer 2010.
Series:Law and philosophy library ; v. 89.
Subjects:
See on Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009450865906719
Table of Contents:
  • Three Tests
  • Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (I): Hart’s Account and the Coordinative-Convention Approach
  • Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (II): Raz’s Account
  • Collective Intentional Activities: Shapiro’s Model
  • Kutz on Collective Intentional Activities. Building an Alternative Model: Groups Which Act with No Normative Unity
  • The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type (I). Non-developed Instances of Legal Practice
  • Gilbert’s Account of Collective Activities
  • On Agreements
  • The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type II. Other-Regarding, Developed Institutions. Developed Instances of the Judiciary
  • Developed Instances of Legal Practice. Meeting the Tests.