Human capacities and moral status
Many debates about the moral status of things—for example, debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman animals—eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities of the things in question—for example, their capacities to feel pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capaci...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
New York :
Springer
2010.
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| Edición: | 1st ed. 2010. |
| Colección: | Philosophy and medicine ;
v. 108. |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009449136806719 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- You Are Not What You Think: Capacities, Human Organisms, and Persons
- Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Also: Humans, Our Capacities, and the Powers We Share
- The Only Game in Town: Why Capacities Must Matter Morally
- Little People: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Potential
- Not Just Damaged Goods: Higher-Order Capacities and the Argument from Marginal Cases
- Old Objections and New Directions: Capacities and Moral Status at the Very Borders of Human Life.
