A world without values essays on John Mackie's moral error theory
For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn’t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral state...
| Otros Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Dordrecht [etc.] :
Springer
c2010.
|
| Edición: | 1st ed. 2010. |
| Colección: | Philosophical studies series ;
114. |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009445884406719 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Against Ethics
- Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Doppelganger Problem
- Patterns of Objectification
- Mackie's Internalisms
- Mackie's Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief
- Mackie on Practical Reason
- The Argument from Moral Experience
- Beyond the Error Theory
- Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness
- A Tension in the Moral Error Theory
- Business as Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality
- The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem
- Abolishing Morality.
