Doctrine of eternal recurrence the U.S. military and counterinsurgency doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006
This paper tests and ultimately disproves the assumption that doctrine as written and operations as conducted are tightly linked. Ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine.
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | Inglés |
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Santa Monica, CA :
Rand National Defense Research Institute
2008.
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| Series: | Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ;
OP-200-OSD. Rand counterinsurgency study. Paper ; 6. |
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| See on Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009427822506719 |
Table of Contents:
- Cover; Preface; Contents; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence-The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine; Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: Defining the Terms; Small Wars Before COIN: U.S. Experiences Prior to 1960; The Kennedy Years: The Birth of COIN Doctrine; Limits of Doctrine: Vietnam, 1961 to 1963; Attempts to Put Doctrine into Practice: The PROVN Study, 1965 to 1966; COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1965 to 1968; Doctrine in the Late 1960s; COIN as Practiced: Vietnam, 1969 to 1972; Interlude: COIN and the Military, 1973 to 2003
- COIN Doctrine, 2003 to 2005COIN Operations, 2003 to 2005; Doctrine and Operations in 2006; Getting It Right? COIN in Iraq, 2007; Komer's Lament: COIN Doctrine vs. COIN Practice; Conclusion; References
