Disjointed war military operations in Kosovo, 1999
The 1999 military operation in Kosovo had several deficiences in joint military operations. This study examines all aspects of the conflict, including its political and historical underpinnings, in an attempt to understand these deficiences and to recommend improvements.
| Autores Corporativos: | , |
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| Otros Autores: | |
| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Santa Monica, Calif. :
Rand
2002.
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| Edición: | 1st ed |
| Materias: | |
| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009427813706719 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- PREFACE; FIGURES; TABLES; SUMMARY; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; ABBREVIATIONS; Chapter One INTRODUCTION; A BATTLE OF CONSTRAINTS AND NATO'S STRATEGIC CHOICES; IMPACT ON PLANNING; IMPACT ON AIR OPERATIONS; IMPACT ON TASK FORCE HAWK; THE DEFICIENCIES OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE; ABOUT THE REPORT; Chapter Two AT THE BRINK: APRIL 1998 TO MARCH 1999; MOUNTING TENSIONS AND CONCERNS OVER KOSOVO; OCTOBER CRISIS; RAMBOUILLET AND ITS AFTERMATH; Chapter Three AIR OPERATION; NATO AND U.S. GOALS; PUBLIC RENUNCIATION OF GROUND FORCE OPTIONS; INITIAL OPERATIONS; YUGOSLAV FORCES; SLOWLY EXPANDING AIR OPERATIONS
- NATO'S DETERMINATION TO PREVAIL; SUCCESSES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE OVERALL AIR OPERATION; LOW EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR STRIKES AGAINST FIELDED FORCES; MARGINAL EFFECT IN HALTING VIOLENCE AGAINST KOSOVAR ALBANIANS; Chapter Four TASK FORCE HAWK; ORIGIN AND CONTROVERSY; COMMAND AND CONTROL; TASK FORCE HAWK OPERATIONS; TASK FORCE HUNTER; WHY WASN'T TASK FORCE HAWK EMPLOYED IN KOSOVO?; CONTRIBUTIONS OF TASK FORCE HAWK; Chapter Five ENFORCING THE PEACE; PREPARATION FOR OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN; INITIAL OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO; CHALLENGES FACING KFOR; KOSOVO IN CONTRAST TO BOSNIA; Chapter Six CONCLUSION
- THE LEVERAGE DERIVED FROM AN AIR-LAND CAMPAIGN APPROACH; JOINT "AIR-ONLY" OPERATIONS; PLANNING FOR MAJOR POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS; IMPROVING MILITARY PLANNING; NEED FOR EXPANDED GROUND-FORCE OPTIONS; DISPARITIES IN COALITION CAPABILITIES; NEED FOR INCREASED ARMY CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT CIVIL POLICE TASKS; FINAL THOUGHTS; Appendix LIST OF INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED; BIBLIOGRAPHY
