The political economy of sovereign default : theory and empirics

What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for tr...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Hohmann, Sebastian Author (author)
Formato: Libro electrónico
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: [Place of publication not identified] Graduate Institute Publications 2012
2012
Colección:eCahiers de l'Institut ; 15
Materias:
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009424677206719

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