Goodwill impairment : an empirical investigation of write-offs under SFAS 142 ; mit deutscher Zusammenfassung

Goodwill impairment an empirical investigation of write-offs under SFAS 142 ; mit deutscher Zusammenfassung

In 2001, goodwill amortization in the US was eliminated in favor of an impairment-only approach, which, according to critics, gives managers vast discretion and opportunities for earnings management. Prior research suggests that discretionary asset write-offs are associated with economic factors and...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Otros Autores: Sellhorn, Thorsten, author (author)
Formato: Tesis
Idioma:Inglés
Publicado: Bern Peter Lang International Academic Publishing Group 2018
Frankfurt am Main, Germany : [2004]
Frankfurt am Main, Germany : [2018]
Edición:1st ed
Colección:Bochumer Beiträge zur Unternehmungsführung und Unternehmensforschung ; Band 70.
Materias:
Goodwill (Commerce) > United States.
Write-offs.
Accounting > United States.
Bilanzpolitik
Empirical
Firmenwert
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
Geschäftswert
Goodwill
Impairment
Investigation
Offs
Sellhorn
SFAS
under
USA
US-GAAP
Wertberichtigung
Write
Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull:https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009422486806719
Tabla de Contenidos:
  • Cover
  • List of abbreviations
  • List of symbols
  • List of figures
  • List of tables
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 Problem
  • 1.2 Research question and contribution
  • 1.3 Outline
  • 2 The goodwill debate
  • 2.1 Chapter overview
  • 2.2 The concept of goodwill
  • 2.3 Main issues
  • 2.3.1 Pooling and purchase methods illustrated
  • 2.3.2 Arguments raised in the discussion
  • 2.3.2.1 Conceptual issues
  • 2.3.2.2 Status quo of accounting rules
  • 2.3.2.2.1 United States
  • 2.3.2.2.2 International Accounting Standards
  • 2.3.2.2.3 Germany
  • 2.3.2.3 Practical issues
  • 2.3.3 Theoretical analysis of arguments raised
  • 2.4 Empirical evidence relevant to the goodwill debate
  • 2.4.1 Overview
  • 2.4.2 Research questions
  • 2.4.3 Direct evidence
  • 2.4.3.1 Survey evidence
  • 2.4.3.2 Determinants of goodwill write-offs
  • 2.4.3.3 Determinants of other goodwill-related financial reporting decisions
  • 2.4.3.3.1 Influence of goodwill accounting rules on acquisition premiums
  • 2.4.3.3.2 Determinants of purchase price allocation decisions
  • 2.4.3.3.3 Determinants of amortization parameters
  • 2.4.3.4 Determinants of the purchase/pooling choice
  • 2.4.3.4.1 Factors influencing the purchase/pooling choice
  • 2.4.3.4.2 Managers' willingness to "purchase" the pooling method
  • 2.4.3.5 Managers' lobbying for goodwill-related accounting rules
  • 2.4.4 Indirect evidence
  • 2.4.4.1 Experimental evidence
  • 2.4.4.2 Information content of goodwill write-offs
  • 2.4.4.3 Value relevance of goodwill book value and amortization
  • 2.4.4.3.1 Balance sheet approach
  • 2.4.4.3.2 Combined balance sheet and income statement approaches
  • 2.4.4.3.3 Income statement approach
  • 2.4.4.3.4 International comparison studies
  • 2.4.4.4 Market reactions to the purchase/pooling decision
  • 2.4.4.5 Market reactions to mandated changes in accounting rules for business combinations.
  • 2.5 Summary and implications
  • 3 Empirical research on discretionary asset write-offs
  • 3.1 Chapter overview
  • 3.2 Discretionary asset write-offs as a subject of accounting research
  • 3.3 Determinants of write-off behavior
  • 3.3.1 Earnings management as an explanatory factor
  • 3.3.1.1 Earnings management defined
  • 3.3.1.2 Overview of the earnings management literature
  • 3.3.1.3 Discretionary asset write-offs and earnings management
  • 3.3.2 Theory, hypotheses, and main findings
  • 3.3.2.1 Overview
  • 3.3.2.2 Economic factors
  • 3.3.2.3 Economic-consequences incentives
  • 3.3.2.3.1 Intellectual roots: Positive accounting theory
  • 3.3.2.3.2 Application to financial reporting decisions
  • 3.3.2.3.3 Accounting earnings-based compensation schemes
  • 3.3.2.3.4 Accounting-based debt covenants in lending agreements
  • 3.3.2.3.5 Political costs
  • 3.3.2.3.6 Discriminating between competing hypotheses
  • 3.3.2.4 Capital market-related incentives
  • 3.3.2.4.1 Theoretical fundamentals
  • 3.3.2.4.2 Management's interest in the firm's stock price
  • 3.3.2.4.3 Maximizing earnings
  • 3.3.2.4.4 Income smoothing
  • 3.3.2.4.5 Target accounting
  • 3.3.2.4.5.1 Prevalence of target accounting
  • 3.3.2.4.5.2 Importance of earnings targets
  • 3.3.2.4.5.3 Cross-sectional differences in target-accounting behavior
  • 3.3.2.4.5.4 Market reactions to target accounting
  • 3.3.2.4.6 Big bath
  • 3.3.2.4.7 Rating
  • 3.3.2.4.8 Specific considerations regarding accounting changes and other transitory earnings components
  • 3.3.2.5 Factors restricting management discretion
  • 3.4 Financial statement users' view of discretionary asset write-offs
  • 3.4.1 Information perspective of financial reporting
  • 3.4.2 Research approaches
  • 3.4.3 Main findings
  • 3.4.3.1 Information content studies
  • 3.4.3.2 Association studies
  • 3.5 Summary and implications.
  • 4 Discretionary properties of the impairment-only approach
  • 4.1 Chapter overview
  • 4.2 Main provisions of SFAS 141 and 142
  • 4.3 Frequency
  • 4.3.1 Annual testing
  • 4.3.1.1 Rule
  • 4.3.1.2 Exception
  • 4.3.2 Unscheduled testing when circumstances warrant
  • 4.4 Level of aggregation
  • 4.5 Existence
  • 4.5.1 Reporting unit fair value
  • 4.5.1.1 Quoted market prices
  • 4.5.1.2 Present value techniques
  • 4.5.1.2.1 Measuring fair value as the objective
  • 4.5.1.2.2 Measurement techniques
  • 4.5.1.3 Multiples
  • 4.5.1.4 Preliminary conclusion
  • 4.5.2 Carrying value of reporting unit net assets
  • 4.5.2.1 Allocating assets and liabilities
  • 4.5.2.2 Allocating goodwill
  • 4.5.3 Disposal
  • 4.6 Measurement
  • 4.6.1 Fair value of reporting unit net assets
  • 4.6.1.1 Fictitious purchase price allocation
  • 4.6.1.2 Recognition
  • 4.6.1.3 Measurement
  • 4.6.2 Inclusion of estimates
  • 4.7 Transition
  • 4.7.1 Effective date and initial application
  • 4.7.2 Transitional impairment test
  • 4.7.3 Transitional presentation and disclosures
  • 4.7.4 Reclassification of goodwill and intangible assets
  • 4.8 Intermediate results
  • 5 Empirical investigation of write-off determinants
  • 5.1 Chapter overview
  • 5.2 Hypothesis development
  • 5.2.1 Overview
  • 5.2.2 Economic factors
  • 5.2.3 Financial reporting incentives
  • 5.2.3.1 Economic-consequences incentives
  • 5.2.3.1.1 Compensation
  • 5.2.3.1.2 Debt covenants
  • 5.2.3.1.3 Political costs
  • 5.2.3.2 Capital market-related incentives
  • 5.2.3.2.1 Target accounting
  • 5.2.3.2.1.1 General decision model
  • 5.2.3.2.1.2 Firms exceeding earnings targets
  • 5.2.3.2.1.3 Firms falling short of earnings targets
  • 5.2.3.2.2 Rating
  • 5.2.4 Control variables
  • 5.3 Research design and descriptive information
  • 5.3.1 Variable definition
  • 5.3.2 Sample selection
  • 5.3.3 Descriptive statistics and comparative analyses.
  • 5.4 Regression analysis
  • 5.4.1 Methods employed in studies of write-off determinants
  • 5.4.1.1 Qualitative dependent variables: The write-off decision
  • 5.4.1.2 Limited dependent variables: The write-off amount
  • 5.4.2 Summary of hypotheses
  • 5.4.3 Analysis of the write-off decision
  • 5.4.3.1 Full-sample test
  • 5.4.3.2 Tests for robustness
  • 5.4.3.3 Sub-sample tests
  • 5.4.4 Analysis of the write-off amount
  • 5.4.4.1 Full-sample test
  • 5.4.4.2 Tests for robustness
  • 5.4.4.3 Sub-sample tests
  • 5.5 Inferences
  • 5.5.1 Summary of findings
  • 5.5.2 Limitations
  • 6 Conclusion
  • Appendix
  • List of references
  • List of accounting pronouncements and legal provisions.

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