Rethinking counterinsurgency
British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency, whose base of support is global and whose exploitation of the virtual dimension has outstripped the West's. After analy
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| Formato: | Libro electrónico |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
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Santa Monica, CA :
Rand National Defense Research Institute
2008.
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| Edición: | 1st ed |
| Colección: | Rand counterinsurgency study ;
v. 5. Rand Corporation monograph series. |
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| Ver en Biblioteca Universitat Ramon Llull: | https://discovery.url.edu/permalink/34CSUC_URL/1im36ta/alma991009421477506719 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Cover; Preface; Contents; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; Chapter Two - Successful Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies; The Evolution of Insurgency; The Evolution of Counterinsurgency; The Significance of British Experience; The Significance of the Palestinian Insurgency; Chapter Three - Defining the Environment; The Muslim Dimension; Minority Populations; Muslim States; Muslim Populations in the Operational Space; The Process of Radicalisation; Conclusions; The Virtual Dimension; Chapter Four - Rethinking Strategy and Operations; The Strategic Dilemma
- The Counterinsurgent CampaignOperational Capability; Doctrine Deficit; A Generic Version of the Adversary; The Response Mosaic; Using Force; Coalitions; Operations; Measuring Success and Failure; References
